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Abstract 
This paper examines the effectiveness of active labour market policies (ALMPs) in 
improving labour market outcomes, especially of low-skilled individuals. The empirical 
analysis consists of an aggregate impact approach based on a pooled cross country and time-
series database for 31 advanced countries during the period 1985–2010. A novelty of the 
paper is that it includes aspects of the delivery system to see how the performance of 
ALMPs is affected by different implementation characteristics. Among the notable results, 
the paper finds that ALMPs matter at the aggregate level, both, in terms of reducing 
unemployment, but also in terms of increasing employment and participation. Interestingly, 
start-up incentives are more effective in reducing unemployment than other ALMPs. The 
positive effects seem to be particularly beneficial for the low-skilled. In terms of 
implementation, the paper finds that the most favourable aspect is the allocation of 
resources to programme administration. Finally, a disruption of policy continuity is 
associated with negative effects for all labour market variables analysed.   
Keywords: unemployment, employment, participation rate, ALMPs, implementation, start-
up incentives. 
JEL Codes: E24, H53, J08, J65, J68  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effectiveness of ALMPs in improving labour market outcomes, especially for low-
skilled individuals. Much has been written about the effectiveness of activation measures based on evaluations 
carried out using micro data, yet not enough about their effectiveness at the aggregate level. This is particularly 
true with regards to the role of ALMPs’ implementation characteristics in shaping their overall effects. This 
paper aims to contribute to this debate through an aggregate impact approach which is better placed to measure 
both, the direct and indirect effects of ALMPs. It finds that ALMPs matter at the aggregate level. Training, 
employment incentives, supported employment and direct job creation measures show the most favourable 
results, both in terms of reducing unemployment, but also in terms of increasing employment and participation. 
Spending in start-up incentives is more effective but only in terms of reducing the unemployment rate. 
Importantly, results show that ALMPs are more effective for the low skilled than for the overall population. In 
terms of implementation, the analysis finds that the most favourable aspect is the allocation of resources to 
programme administration. Interestingly, the size of the coefficients arising from policy and implementation 
variables, once interactions are included is noticeably higher. This demonstrates that a correct implementation of 
policies enhances their beneficial effect. 
Since the 1990s there has been an increased acceptance in the developed world of the need for activation 
measures to strengthen the link between social protection, labour market policies and employment. Today, these 
policies are widely regarded as an important tool in fighting unemployment. As a result, expenditure in ALMPs 
is sizeable in most advanced economies and continues to increase. Success of ALMPs, however, has not been 
invariably positive. Although some empirical evidence exists that points to a positive effect on the probability of 
finding employment (e.g. Layard et al. 2009; Graversen and van Ours, 2008; Lalive et al. 2005), the effects tend 
to be relatively small, making it unclear whether the positive outcomes are enough to compensate for the costs. 
Moreover, a central concern that remains is whether activation measures are suitable to address longer-term 
matters such as skills and employability, especially among the least employable jobless individuals.  
Importantly, most of what we know today in terms of the effectiveness of activation measures is based on 
evaluations carried out using micro data. A well-established microeconomic literature exists today on the effects 
of these policies and their design and delivery systems at the individual level. The overall effects of ALMPs, 
however, have been less documented. Macroeconomic evaluations of ALMPs have not been carried out 
systematically yet, at least not taking into account implementation characteristics. In fact, few comprehensive 
studies centred specifically on the effects of ALMPs have been carried out since the beginning of the 90s and 
they point to different results with regards to the effect of ALMPs on unemployment rates. While Layard et al. 
(1991) find that ALMPs have a negative effect on long-term unemployment, the OECD (1993) argues that 
results are not robust enough to be conclusive. More recently, Estevão (2003) found positive effects of ALMPs 
on the employment rate of the business sector in the 1990s but not in the late 1980s. Importantly, studies in 
which the effectiveness of ALMPs is linked to implementation aspects are even scarcer (Schmid et al., 2001; 
Calmfors, 1994; de Koning and van Nes, 1991). As such, existing knowledge on the aggregate effects of 
activation measures and their design remains inconclusive. 
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This paper aims to contribute to this debate in the literature. The analysis is done by ways of a pooled cross 
country and time-series analysis based on 31 advanced countries for which detailed annual data on different 
ALMPs (focusing on those specifically targeted to low-skilled individuals) exists for the period 1985–2010. The 
study contributes to the empirical evaluation of activation policies beyond what it is already known in four ways: 
First, the paper includes aspects of the delivery system in the analysis to shed light on the role of implementation 
characteristics in explaining differences in the performance of ALMPs between countries. Second, it is focused 
on the labour market outcomes of low-skilled individuals that have been among the least researched 
marginalized groups. Third, it provides an update of the aggregate assessment approach by extending the time 
and country coverage of the dataset.1 Finally, the estimation includes specific econometric techniques (i.e. 
instrumental variables) aimed to address the endogeneity problem that has weakened many of the ALMP 
analyses. As it is argued later in the paper, these methods yielded stable results unveiling reliable estimates of the 
overall net effect of activation policies in the labour market.  
2. Theoretical justification and transmission mechanisms 
From the theoretical point of view, the traditional justification for ALMPs has been to reduce labour market 
imbalances and counteract rigidities and distortions. This comes from the recognition that governments cannot 
address sustainably unemployment through demand expansion alone (Bellmann and Jackman, 1996a). ALMPs 
are therefore needed, first, to facilitate the matching process between the supply and demand for labour so that a 
given number of job-seekers is associated with fewer vacancies; second, to maintain the level of effective labour 
supply by keeping the long-term unemployed and other groups of “outsiders” tight to the labour force (Layard 
and Nickell, 1986; Layard et al. 1991); third, to affect the demand for labour therefore increasing the number of 
available jobs (Pissarides, 1990); and fourth, to boost the productivity of the labour force, both through the direct 
effect of activation measures on programme participants, but also through general productivity increases 
associated with externalities. 
The direction and magnitude of these effects would depend on the specific type of measure put in place and its 
target group (Appendix 1). In general:  
• According to Keynesian theory, measures aimed to overcome structural labour market imbalances (i.e. 
employment incentives, job-search assistance, public job creation and certain other direct-job-creation 
measures such as those offering hiring credits) can increase the level of employment through an income 
effect and a multiplier effect. However, these measures can lead to displacement and substitution effects, 
when jobs created for a particular category of workers supplant jobs for other categories (OECD, 1993; 
Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).  
• In the case of placement services and all types of job-search assistance, the benefits to the labour market 
result from an increased effectiveness of search (Schmid et al. 2001, Bellman and Jackman 1996b, OECD, 
1993). Job-search assistance might also increase the number of vacancies because opening posts becomes 
less costly for firms (Pissarides, 1990; Calmfors and Lang, 1995; OECD, 1993), which in turn would 
expand labour demand. However, some economists predict a reduction in search efforts – and a raise in 
                                                          
1
 From around 20 to 25 years and from around 20 to 31 advanced economies. 
4 
 
wage pressure – since government support may reduce the fear of unemployment (Bellman and Jackman, 
1996a; Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).   
• Labour-supply-oriented measures (including training, workers’ subsidies, supported employment and 
rehabilitation and job rotation and job sharing measures), are expected to have little, if any, impact on the 
level of unemployment (Schmid, 1996). Yet, these measures will potentially have a stronger impact on the 
structure of unemployment by reducing skill bottlenecks and the vulnerability of groups that are more 
exposed to risks in the labour market, such as the unskilled or long-term unemployed (OECD, 1993). This 
would have a redistributive and reallocating effect of employment opportunities. Search effectiveness can 
also be improved thanks to these policies, since participating on training courses can provide a positive 
signal to potential employers, reducing uncertainty about the employability of job applicants (Bellman and 
Jackman 1996b; Layard and Nickell, 1986; OECD, 1993). More generally, increases in productivity are 
thought to have positive externalities that would contribute to general productivity increases (OECD, 1993) 
and to general technical progress of societies (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). However, participants may 
also reduce their search efforts in the expectation that the course culminates (i.e. lock-in effect) (Bellman 
and Jackman 1996b). Moreover, labour demand can be reduced if the scale effect resulting of an increase in 
the marginal productivity of labour (i.e. that shifts labour demand upwards because a fall of the relative unit 
cost of labour provides an incentive to expand output by using more efficient units of labour) is dominated 
by the substitution effect (i.e. arising since one unit of product can be produced by less units of labour) 
(Calmfors, 1994).  
• Specifically relevant for this paper, ALMPs that focus on marginal groups (long-term unemployed, low-
qualified individuals, etc.) can be especially effective. They could raise employability, compel the 
unemployed to search harder for jobs and lead to lower reservation wages, which can stimulate labour 
demand and facilitate employment (e.g. Bellman and Jackman 1996a). However, in the absence of specific 
components aimed to raise employability, ALMPs could result in wage moderation and even in an increase 
in the number of working poor (e.g. Clasen and Clegg, 2006). In general, the weaker the affiliation of 
targeted group to the labour market, the less likely it would be for activation measures to affect their 
employment prospects (Layard et al. 2009).   
• In general, in times of crisis, characterized by high levels of unemployment and low unfilled vacancies, a 
given level of aggregate employment needs to be assumed, which would reduce the effectiveness of 
ALMPs. Given the lack of new available jobs, ALMPs could lead to substitution and displacement effects. 
Under these circumstances, a stricter targeting can be justified economically by its potential to affect 
specific groups even if the aggregate effects of ALMPs are low. In this context, redistributing employment 
opportunities in favour of disadvantaged groups (e.g. low-skilled individuals) can be a way of enhancing 
the effectiveness of ALMPs (de Koning, 2001). 
In terms of the methodologies available for assessing the impact of ALMPs at the aggregate level, several 
models exist, which have evolved over time. Analyses based on the flow model approach are, by far, the most 
commonly exploited method to carry out research at the aggregate level in the field of activation policies. These 
models study the direct effects of ALMPs on the friction between labour supply and demand and the transitions 
from unemployment to employment (de Koning, 2001). The oldest attempts to measure the impact of ALMPs on 
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the efficiency of the labour market were carried from the mid-60s all through the 70s and 80s. The regional 
version of flow-model approach has been increasingly applied during the last decade.2 Today, this approach 
constitutes a well-established methodology to measure the net effect of labour market policies exclusively on the 
matching process (given windfall, substitution and displacement effects on outflows from unemployment) 
(Bellmann and Jackman, 1996a). 
Meanwhile, some few efforts were developed in the late 80s and beginning of the 90s that presented a more 
general model to study the impact of ALMPs on a number of critical economic and labour market variables 
(Layard and Nickell, 1986; OECD, 1993). This approach allows capturing the impact of ALMPs on the 
efficiency of the matching process and on the size of the labour force, while also taking into consideration its 
indirect effects. The model is based on the assumption that ALMPs have the ability to: (i) enhance the 
employability of labour supply, facilitating recruitment; and (ii) reduce frictions between labour supply and 
demand, boosting employment. Indirectly, employability increases also influence wage levels, which again 
affects the labour market and the economy more broadly. As such, this approach is capable of shedding light on 
the direct impact of ALMPs, while also taking into account productivity and competition effects (insiders vs. 
outsiders), deadweight loss, and substitution, crowding-out and lock-in effects (Bellman and Jackman, 1996a; 
Calmfors, 1994). No other approach allows capturing empirically the overall net effect of ALMPs on the wide 
labour market. 
Empirically, however, evidence from international comparisons on the impact of ALMPs has been contentious. 
Historically, a major drawback encountered by the proponents of this cross-country approach is the existence of 
a simultaneity bias (reverse causality), stemming from the fact that although the scale of ALMP provisions is 
meant to affect the size of unemployment, unemployment could also drive spending on ALMPs (e.g. if 
governments base their expenditure decisions on the magnitude of the problem they wish to address).  
During the 90s, the quest for addressing this reverse causality focused on defining a medium-term policy 
reaction function that could realistically predict policy spending patterns of governments. Two clearly opposed 
theoretical frameworks arose with regards to this issue. The first one assumed that governments based their 
decisions on a fix level of ALMP spending per unemployed person, which could vary slightly over time but that 
could not adjust fully with unemployment (Layard et al., 1991). However, measuring ALMP spending per 
unemployed person would result in an endogeneity problem. Thus, under this scenario, the suggested solution to 
address the simultaneity problem was to look at average unemployment rates and average levels of spending on 
ALMPs per unemployed person over the medium-term. If the assumed policy-reaction function were a realistic 
representation, the policy stance would indeed be exogenous in the proposed scheme. The second theoretical 
framework assumed that governments committed a given fraction of GDP to ALMP spending over the medium-
term, which did not adjust with the unemployment rate (OECD, 1993). In this situation, ALMP spending was 
measured as a share of GDP, which authors sustained, did not have an endogeneity problem.  
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Anxo et al. (2001) for a regional aggregate impact analysis of ALMPs in France and Sweden, carried out by 
means of an augmented matching function. Schmid et al. (2001) carried out a similar analysis for Germany, with special focus on 
the long-term unemployed, and de Koning and Arents (2001) for the Netherlands. More recently, Hujer et al. (2009) used this 
approach for Western Germany and Dauth et al. (2010) for Austria.  
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Importantly, different assumptions about governments’ policy stance yielded different results with regards to the 
effect of ALMPs on unemployment rates. While Layard et al. (1991) found that ALMPs had a reducing effect on 
long-term unemployment, the OECD (1993) argued that results were not robust enough to be conclusive. 
Unfortunately, it is still far from clear what a correct representation of the policy-reaction function is and it might 
well be the case that whatever the representation it would not be the same across countries. Conscious of this 
problem and of the importance of addressing endogeneity other efforts arose later, which tackled the issue 
mainly through fixed-effect estimators and instrumental variables (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; Büttner and 
Prey, 1997; Schmid et al., 2001; Estevão, 2003).3 However, given the incipient knowledge about estimators 
capable of dealing with reverse causality and methods to test the instruments’ strength and overidentifying 
restrictions, it remained far from clear whether the endogeneity problem was actually addressed in these studies.  
As such, existing knowledge on the aggregate effects of activation measures remains inconclusive. Deepening 
the understanding of the broader effects of ALMPs is, however, all the more relevant today. First, many 
advanced countries are under tight budgets and, given the mixed empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
ALMPs, spending on these policies is under careful scrutiny. Second, the last decade has seen an important 
development of tools and methodologies to treat a wider range of empirical problems. For instance, a variety of 
econometric estimators, technical fixes and diagnostic tests exists today to treat the endogeneity issue.4 Finally, 
the availability of longer time series allows controlling better the sensitivity of policies to the business cycle 
(Schmid et al., 2001). As such, the potential for capturing the full effects of ALMPs and deepening the 
understanding of their effectiveness has increased of late. 
3. Empirical specification 
3.1 Description of the model 
Based on these new developments, the present paper is a renewed effort to capture the overall effects of ALMPs 
at a macroeconomic level. In order to assess how effective ALMPs are in improving labour market outcomes, 
especially for low-skilled individuals, this paper uses a panel data model based on a structural equation with the 
following simple form:  
 = 	(, 
,, , 
)	 
where, LM represents the selected labour market indicators, including those relative to the low skilled; ALMP 
denotes active labour market policy indicators and IMPL, indicators relative to implementation characteristics. 
The remaining three groups of variables are controls: DC includes determinants of demand conditions, STRUC 
the structure of the labour market (which influences the speed of adjustment to structural change or demand and 
supply shocks) and INST a range of institutional arrangements. 
                                                          
3
 Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Scarpetta (1996) also analyse the effects of ALMPs on unemployment from a cross-country 
perspective but not as their main objective. Their central aim is to unveil the effects of institutional settings on unemployment and 
therefore they include ALMPs as a single variable or as an interaction.   
4
 In fact, there are a number of studies that have successfully used these techniques in international empirical analysis of labour 
market policies other than ALMPs. Cahuc and Carcillo (2011), for example, used IV and GMM methods in their cross-country 
analysis of short time work arrangements during the 2008 recession to treat the endogeneity bias that plagued their results. Both IV 
and GMM methods yielded stable results, successfully correcting the endogeneity bias. In a similar study (using somewhat different 
estimation strategies), Hijzen and Martin (2013) address the problem of endogeneity through the use of an instrumental variable for 
short-time work based on the number of years for which a scheme has been in existence. 
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The analysis consists of an aggregate impact approach based on a pooled cross-country and time-series database 
for 31 advanced countries with yearly information during the period 1985–2010. The long time series allows 
increasing the number of observations and providing greater statistical power.  
3.2  Selection of variables and hypotheses  
Dependant variables 
Seven indicators were selected as dependant variables. The first three measure labour market outcomes of the 
overall population and include the unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio and the labour force 
participation rate (LFPR). The first indicator allows measuring the effects of ALMPs on the long-term level of 
the unemployment rate, but will not say much about whether its reduction is accompanied by higher employment 
or higher inactivity. To get the complete picture, the participation rate is taken into account to assess the impact 
of policies in bringing people back to the labour market and the employment rate to evaluate their effect in 
bringing people back to employment.  
Regarding the specific effects of policies on labour market outcomes of low-skilled individuals, as with the first 
model, I use the unemployment, employment and labour force participation rates of low-skilled individuals as 
dependant variables. In addition, I include the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals as a percentage of 
total unemployment to take into account the effects of policies on the “structuralization” of lack of skills in the 
labour market (Schmid et al., 2001). This is based on the assumption that the higher the concentration of 
unemployment on the low-skilled, the higher the real wage rigidity and the higher the persistence of the 
unemployment rate – i.e. wages at the lower end are not flexible due to labour institutions in place in charge of 
protecting low-wage incomes (Nickell and Bell, 1997). This last equation would test whether ALMPs are 
providing incentives to workers for acquiring new skills or to enterprises for enhancing the demand for low-
skilled labour. 
Policy intervention 
As discussed above, a correct representation of the policy stance of governments – on which base it will be 
anchored the definition of the policy variable – is the first fundamental step to tackle the endogeneity problem 
that is so common in policy analyses. I assume in this paper that the medium-term policy reaction function of 
governments regarding ALMP spending is based on a fixed level of expenditure per unemployed individual – 
which could be somewhat adjusted based on a cyclical component (Layard et al., 1991). This would imply a 
positive correlation between total ALMP spending and unemployment but a negative correlation between ALMP 
spending per unemployed individual and unemployment, which is in fact the case for the panel of countries 
analysed in this paper.  
Following this policy stance, the policy intervention measure computed for the analysis is defined as real 
expenditure on ALMPs per unemployed person (Heylen, 1993; Bellmann and Jackman, 1996b).5 Importantly, 
different policies can produce different effects depending on their objective, design and population targeted 
                                                          
5
 The ratio of government expenditure in ALMPs to GDP has also been used in the past as discussed above (OECD, 1993). In this 
paper, this definition does not seem to represent the correct policy stance of governments since in our sample of countries the ratio 
of ALMPs to GDP does not remain constant over time. It declines even when considering periods of economic growth only.  
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(Appendix 1). To take account of these different effects, total ALMP spending was broken down in three 
different categories, which are explained in detail in Section 4. 
Implementation 
Moreover, it can be expected that the design and implementation of ALMPs will shape their overall effects. 
Indeed, the benefits of policies can be reduced or cancelled if they are badly targeted and implemented, 
regardless of the expected positive effects and the magnitude of resources allocated (de Koning, 1993) 
With this in mind, three different aspects of implementation have been included in the analysis. First, I include 
the magnitude of resources allocated to the implementation of policies (proxied by public expenditure on 
programme administration, PES). It is to be expected that policies will be more effective in countries that have 
higher spending on programme administration per unemployed individual, since that would imply that 
programmes are better resourced and that their administration is better equipped to deliver employment services 
efficiently.    
In addition, continuity and timing of implementation have been included in the analysis. Continuity matters since 
large fluctuations in public spending (i.e. exceeding cyclical swings) are likely to compromise the stability 
needed for implementation, which would be detrimental in terms of effectiveness (Schmid, 1996). The timing is 
important too and higher effectiveness could be expected from policies that are implemented in a countercyclical 
manner (i.e. spending on ALMPs that runs in opposite direction of the economic trend and parallel to changes in 
the unemployment rate).  
Demand conditions 
Moreover, it is assumed in the literature that the overall and low-skilled unemployment rates are determined by 
demand conditions, which I illustrate in the paper by the growth rate of GDP. It is expected that an increasing 
demand should reduce the level of unemployment or at least slow down its growth, although the effect may not 
be immediate.  
Structure of the labour market 
The structure of national labour markets is taken into account as well since it can influence structural changes 
and the speed of adjustment to shocks. Two characteristics of the labour market are especially interesting for this 
analysis. First, I include the concentration of the population on a particular skill level, measured by the share of 
the population with tertiary education. It can be assumed that the higher the concentration of the high-skilled, the 
easier it would be for policies to be effective since highly educated individuals have more probabilities to find a 
job. Moreover, I include the middle- and high-skilled unemployment rates to control for the effects of large 
unemployment differences across skill groups.6   
Institutional arrangements  
Controls for differences in institutional arrangements that can affect wage bargaining and macroeconomic 
performance were also included in the estimation. Union density (the proportion of workforce unionized) is 
                                                          
6
 However, results were not robust when both rates were used in the analysis, thus the middle-skilled unemployment rate was 
dropped to avoid the presence of multicollinearity. 
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included to control for insider power in wage bargaining, which may push wages upwards at a cost of lower 
employment especially for groups whose labour supply is more elastic (e.g. low-skilled workers) (Layard et al. 
2009). Moreover, the OECD index for the strictness of EPL for the layoff of temporary workers was included. 
Temporary layoff regulation can reduce search effectiveness of the unemployed since workers who lose their 
jobs can be recalled, with detrimental consequences on the level of employment (Bellmann and Jackman, 
1996b).  
Pure control variables 
Finally, EU countries have a relatively integrated labour market due to a relative freedom in the movement of 
workers. To control for this special feature of the European labour market, a dummy variable was added taking 
the value of 1 for countries that are members of the European Union.   
3.3  Empirical strategy 
Seven different models were estimated to measure the effectiveness of ALMPs. The first three measure the 
effects of ALMPs on labour market outcomes of the overall population and the other four the effects on the 
specific target group of this analysis, the low-skilled.7 For each specification, fixed effects, random effects and 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) models were estimated. The suitability of the random- or fixed-effects 
specification was examined by the Hausman test. In certain cases (employment rate, LFPR, low-skilled 
employment rate and low-skilled LFPR) a correlation of the entities’ error terms with the regressors was found, 
which invalidated the use of random effects. Fixed-effect models were used in these four cases.   
Moreover, serial correlation is usually expected in macro panels with long time series like the one used in this 
paper, especially as a result of omitting variables that change gradually over time (Lusinyan and Bonato, 2007). I 
use the Lagrange-Multiplier test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) and the Arellano-Bond post-estimation 
technique (abar) (Roodman, 2006) to test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms. In all cases the 
null hypothesis was rejected, concluding that the data suffered from first order autocorrelation. In this context, 
OLS, random- and fixed-effects models are biased and/or inconsistent, since they underestimate standard errors 
of the coefficients. To account for this, an additional estimator was used in all specifications: a feasible 
generalized least squares model (GLS) fitted for panel data. This estimator allows for the assessment in the 
presence of AR1 autocorrelation within panels, cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. 
Results of the pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS), GLS (either fixed- or random-effects), and FGLS with 
AR1 correction are detailed in columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of the tables presented in Appendix 5.  
In addition, as discussed above, given the specification of the models and the shape of the policy variables, it can 
be expected that the different estimations will suffer from reverse causality. Indeed, it is not only ALMPs that 
affect unemployment but it may also be the case that changes in unemployment could influence expenditure in 
ALMPs. In this event, it has been widely demonstrated that coefficients estimated through OLS and GLS might 
be inconsistent and biased. Some authors have dealt with this problem by either normalizing ALMPs to a fixed 
                                                          
7
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller test was used to control for the non-stationarity of dependent variables. In all cases (but one) the 
tests rejected the null hypotheses of non-stationarity at 1 and 5 per cent levels. The exception was the variable share of low-skilled 
unemployed individuals which did not pass the test and can be therefore assumed to be non-stationary. 
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fraction of GDP over the medium-term or by using country-specific averages of ALMP expenditures over the 
period analysed. Neither solution is optimal in my view: the former assumes a policy stance that is not a correct 
representation of reality (at least in the panel of countries used for this study, as discussed above) and the latter 
eliminates the time varying property of the variables of analysis, something that seems incorrect giving the long 
period studied. To address the specification problem caused by endogeneity and take account of the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, a final estimation was carried out instrumenting (i.e. finding variables correlated with the 
endogenous variables, but not correlated with the error term) policy variables through a 2-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimator. The complete discussion of this estimation and the tests and options used are discussed in 
section 5.3 and presented in Appendix 6.  
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1   Construction of the database 
The variables used in the analysis draw from different sources of information. The exact definitions and sources 
can be found in Appendix 2. Labour market variables (employment, unemployment, labour force and working 
age population) for the overall population for the 31 countries analysed in this paper were collected from the 
Labour Force Survey dataset of OECD.8  
The low-skilled unemployment rate and employment-to-population ratio draw from the Eurostat database for the 
23 European countries for which information is available in this dataset. To draw information for the low-skilled 
unemployment rate of the remaining countries, I used ILO databases9 for Australia, Canada, Israel, Mexico and 
the United States; and national sources for Japan, Korea and New Zealand. Regarding the low-skilled 
employment rate, I used OECD Education at Glance indicators (2004–2012) to gather information for Australia, 
Israel and Mexico, and national sources for Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the United States. The 
LFPR was calculated on the basis of the unemployment and employment rates. Finally, the share of low-skilled 
unemployed individuals as a percentage of total unemployment was gathered from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators database, which contains information for the whole sample of countries, although not 
for all years – e.g. the latest year for which information is available is 2008. 
Skill level is measured by the level of educational attainment as defined by the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) (UNESCO, 1997). As such, the low-skilled in this paper include 
individuals with pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2 of ISCED); the middle-skilled 
those with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3-4); and the high-skilled those 
that have finalized tertiary education (levels 5-6). The definition of the variable in countries where information 
was gathered from national sources varies slightly. In Japan, low-skilled individuals are those with primary 
school, junior or senior high school; middle-skilled those with junior college; and high-skilled individuals that 
have coursed college or university, including graduate school. In Korea, low-skilled are middle-school graduates 
and below, middle-skilled are high school graduates and high-skilled are college and university graduates. In 
                                                          
8
 All variables obtained from OECD were gathered from OECD.Stat, which is an online repository of data and metadata for OECD 
countries and selected non-member economies.  
9
 KILM (Key Indicators of the Labour Market) and ILO.Stat. 
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New Zealand, low-skilled are individuals with no school qualification, middle-skilled those with either school 
qualification or post school but no school qualification and high-skilled those with post school and school 
qualification. Finally, the low skilled category in Canada and the United States includes individuals with no 
schooling and persons who received some schooling but did not obtain a secondary or high-school diploma.  
Policy intervention variables derive from OECD Employment Outlook databases. Policy categories used in this 
paper thus follow the OECD classification and definitions. These categories include: 
• Training: Consists of targeted training programmes including institutional, workplace and integrated 
training and special support for apprenticeships.  
• Job rotation and job sharing: Includes measures that promote the full substitution of an employee by an 
individual (unemployed or not) from another target group for a fixed period. Job sharing schemes 
include all measures that encourage the partial substitution of employees by an individual (unemployed 
or not) from another target group.  
• Employment incentives: Includes recruitment and employment maintenance incentives.  
• Supported employment and rehabilitation: Consists of subsidies for the hiring of individuals with a 
long-term or permanently reduced capacity to work, and for the vocational rehabilitation of people with 
a reduced working capacity.  
• Direct job creation: Includes measures aimed to create additional jobs for the long-term unemployed or 
individuals otherwise difficult to place. Jobs created are usually of community benefit and are usually 
located in the public or non-profit sectors. This should not include support for lifetime protected work in 
a non-productive environment. 
• Start-up incentives: Includes measures that encourage entrepreneurship among unemployed and other 
target groups. 
Measures included in the analysis are restricted to targeted policies. This excludes measures that are generally 
available such as in-work benefits for all employees whose income fall below a threshold, or training and 
apprenticeship programmes that are generally available to employed adults or youth. Appendix 3 illustrates how 
country-specific policies fit the ALMP categories described above.    
For each category, the variable computed was defined as real expenditure per unemployed person, following the 
policy stance analysis discussed above. For comparability across countries, expenditures were converted to 
international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. In order to deal with the 
multicollinearity arising between policy variables, a cluster was computed (policy cluster) bringing together 
training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job creation policies.  
One of the novelties of the analysis presented in this paper is the inclusion of implementation-related variables in 
the analysis of the effectiveness of ALMPs. Three performance indicators were constructed capturing three 
different dimensions of implementation: allocation of resources to the implementation of policies, continuity and 
timing in the implementation of programmes. The first dimension is measured by the overall expenditure on 
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programme administration10 as a percentage of total expenditure in ALMPs. Second, following Schmid (1996), 
continuity in the implementation of programmes is measured by the dynamics of ALMP expenditure, i.e. large 
annual variation in spending (fluctuations that exceed cyclical swings) would be the antithesis of continuity in 
implementation. This variation was captured by the difference between the fluctuations (measured by the 
standard deviation) in real GDP growth and the growth rate of ALMP spending. Third, as explained above, the 
variable timing measures whether policies are implemented in a countercyclical or pro-cyclical manner (Schmid, 
1996). To assess this, the regression coefficients between ALMP spending and both output and unemployment 
were calculated. A dummy variable was then created taking the value of 1 if expenditure on ALMPs ran parallel 
to changes in the unemployment rate and counter the economic trend (i.e. policies that were implemented 
counter-cyclically) and 0 otherwise.  
Regarding the demand conditions variable, GDP was drawn from the National Accounts section of OECD 
Economic Outlook dataset. In addition, as explained above, two aspects of the labour market are included to 
control for the structure of the labour market: (i) the share of the population with tertiary education was gathered 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators database; (ii) the middle- and high-skilled unemployment 
rates follow the same sources used for the low-skilled unemployment rates. Finally, the two institutional 
arrangement variables (i.e. union density and strictness of employment protection for temporary employment) 
are drawn, respectively, from the ICTWSS11 and EPL databases of the OECD. EPL is measured by Version 1 of 
the indicator given that it contains annual information since 1985 (although this version does not incorporate all 
the data items included in Version 3).12  
The analysis is based on data for 31 OECD countries over the 25-year period 1985–2010, which yields a total of 
806 observations. Yet, information is not usually available for all countries for every year so most of the 
regressions are based on a smaller data set. For example, the number of countries is reduced to 27 when using 
the FGLS estimator with correction for first-order autocorrelation (i.e. the preferred specification) due to the 
unavailability of information about union density and EPL for temporary workers for Israel, Estonia, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia. 
4.2 Evolution of ALMPs 
Since the 1990s there has been a growing interest in activation measures. Today, expenditure in ALMPs is 
sizeable in most advanced economies and continues to increase. Between 2004 and 2009, ALMP expenditure 
grew continuously at an average annual rate of 5.8 per cent, reaching an accumulated growth of 32.5 per cent 
and a total spending of US$176.5 billion (PPP) in the five years to 2009. Only in 2010, this expansion was 
interrupted and ALMP spending fell by close to 0.7 per cent (Figure 1).  
                                                          
10
 Which is defined by governments’ expenditure in Public Employment Services and includes: (i) public expenditure in placement 
and related services, (ii) benefit administration, and (iii) other services and activities, including both, the budget of institutions that 
manage placement and related services and ALMPs but also the budget of institutions that administer unemployment and early 
retirement benefits. It is important to note that in some countries the share of expenditure in PES corresponding to the latter two 
subcategories might be significant. For example, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand and the United States have a significant share of (ii) 
in their total PES. Moreover, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Spain, have a 
significant portion of (iii); and in Ireland the mix of both categories represents the biggest share. 
11
 Visser (2011). 
12
 This is, item 16 (authorisation and reporting requirements for TWAs) and 17 (equal treatment for TWA workers) 
(www.oecd.org/employment/protection). 
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ALMP spending per unemployed individual has also increased in a sustained manner – by an accumulated 25.5 
per cent between 2004 and 2008. In 2009 and 2010, however, this upward trend ended abruptly due to the rise in 
the number of unemployed as a consequence of the crisis.  
Figure 1. Evolution of total expenditure on ALMPs, 2004–2010 
 
                   Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD.Stat. 
In terms of the distribution of expenditure by type of policy, an important share of spending on ALMPs 
(excluding PES and administration) remained concentrated in training measures, which represented close to 39 
per cent of the total in 2010 (Figure 2). Spending in employment incentives, direct job creation and supported 
employment and rehabilitation measures also represented prominent shares with 22.2, 16.8 and 15.7 per cent, 
respectively. Meanwhile, the share of expenditure in start-up incentives was much lower – at 6.2 per cent of total 
expenditure – and that of job rotation and job sharing programmes was negligible. Relative to 2004, the different 
types of policies have maintained their relative importance, with minor exceptions. For example, a small 
decrease in the share of spending in supported employment and rehabilitation measures seems to have given way 
to an increase in spending in direct job creation.    
The overall growth in expenditure on ALMPs during the period 2004–2010 was driven by training, in spite of a 
decrease in its share in 2010. It accounted for one-third of the total increase in ALMP spending (excluding PES 
and administration) during the period. Employment incentives and direct-job-creation measures are the second 
and third sources of growth in ALMP expenditure, accounting for around 27 and 24.5 per cent of the total 
increase, respectively. Conversely, spending in supported employment and rehabilitation fell during the period, 
thus its contribution to growth only accounted for 7.7 per cent.   
In sum, training continues to be the preferred tool of governments to address labour market problems in 
advanced countries. Meanwhile, employment incentives and direct-job-creation measures have become more 
prominent. The remaining of this section will test whether targeting spending towards these priority policies 
would be the most effective way to address labour market challenges and imbalances.   
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Figure 2. Share of the expenditure by type of ALMP in 2004 and 2010 and in the  
change between 2004–2010 (percentages of total ALMP expenditure*) 
 
               * Excluding PES and administration. 
                Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD.Stat. 
4.3  Descriptive statistics 
A summary of basic descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix 4. 
Importantly, as shown by the pairwise correlations, implementation variables are closely related to policy 
intervention ones. This is to be expected since the effect of policy interventions depends on the quality of 
implementation. To avoid a misspecification arising from the omission of these relationships, a number of 
interaction terms were tested through individual and joint tests for the non-significance of interactions terms. 
Three interactions proved significant indicating they should be added to the model to ensure a correct 
specification: cluster * PES allocation; cluster * timing; cluster * continuity.13 Finally, an additional interaction 
term was added between the variables Cycle and timing to capture the fact that countercyclical policies may be 
more or less effective depending on the moment of the economic cycle.  
                                                          
13
 Omitting relevant interaction terms would constrain the partial derivatives of both Policy Cluster and the three implementation 
variables to be constant rather than varying, as they would be for the equation including the interaction terms (Baum, 2006, p. 125).  
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5. Econometric results 
5.1  Description of results 
Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 below report the effects of ALMPs expenditures on the unemployment, employment and 
labour force participation rates (LFPR) of the overall and low-skilled population and on the share of low-skilled 
unemployed individuals. All models presented in these tables report results estimated by FGLS with AR1 
correction, which is the preferred specification. For each parameter, interactions were added one by one to check 
whether results change with each addition. This allows flagging the size of variations due to the inclusion of 
interaction terms, which in most cases are correlated with the underlying explanatory variables.14  
Effects on the unemployment rate 
Estimates relative to the unemployment rate are presented in Table 1. Results show that the policy cluster (i.e. 
public expenditure in training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation and direct job 
creation measures) has a significant negative effect on the total unemployment rate and the unemployment rate 
of the low-skilled. The effect of start-up incentives on the unemployment rates of both groups is also negative 
and significant. Finally, job rotation and job sharing has a negative but non-significant effect on the 
unemployment rate of these groups, which might be due to the fact that expenditure in these policies is small in 
relative terms. Interestingly, in general, ALMPs seem to be more effective in reducing the unemployment rate of 
the low skilled than that of the overall population.  
These findings are consistent with empirical evaluations carried out using micro data, which suggest that job-
search assistance and classroom and on-the-job training are especially effective (Card et al., 2010; Kluve et al., 
2008). In fact, job-search assistance appears to be more effective than training in the short term, whilst in the 
medium term the effect of training tends to increase due to gains to human capital (Card et al., 2010; Hotz et al., 
2006). Subsidized employment programmes can also be effective, sometimes even exceeding the effects of 
training (Kluve, 2010), but this is not systematically the case in the literature.  
Importantly, implementation seems to matter too. Raising the share of PES in total ALMP expenditure has a 
reducing effect on the unemployment rate of both population groups, although this effect is significantly 
different from zero only in the case of the overall unemployment rate. This finding supports the conclusions 
from a number of micro-econometric studies carried out in OECD countries that show consistently positive 
outcomes from investing in PES (Martin and Grubb, 2001). The variable timing, which measures whether 
policies are implemented in a countercyclical or procyclical manner, matters too, implying that countercyclical 
policies (timing=1) have an unemployment reducing effect. Finally, the effect of policy continuity is significant 
only in the case of the low-skilled and has a negative effect as well but only once the cycle-timing interaction is 
included.  
The interaction of timing with the policy cluster is also significant and has a positive effect on the unemployment 
                                                          
14 Note that the analysis is based on 27 countries. Israel was dropped from all regressions due to total unavailability of information 
about union density. Estonia and Luxembourg were dropped because not enough temporal information is available on EPL for 
temporary workers to carry out the analysis. The same occurred with Slovenia but with two variables, union density and EPL for 
temporary workers. This is relevant for all equations presented in tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
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rate of both population groups.15 It suggests that when policies are implemented in a countercyclical manner 
(timing=1), the unemployment reducing effect of the policy cluster is lower.16 This implies that policies that are 
implemented procyclically have a stronger unemployment reducing effect during booms but also a stronger 
unemployment enhancing effect during crises. This confirms the argument in favour of policy continuity that 
advises investing in ALMPs during booms when resources are available but also during crises when the 
unemployed need that support the most. This argument is also confirmed by the cycle-timing interaction, which 
is also significant for the low-skilled. It shows that when policies are implemented countercyclically, the 
elasticity of the unemployment rate to the cycle is lower. Finally, the interaction between the policy cluster and 
the share of PES is also significant for the low-skilled group, albeit only at the 10 per cent level. It shows that the 
unemployment reducing effect of the policy cluster becomes stronger as more ALMP resources are devoted to 
PES and administration.17  
Interestingly, the size of the coefficients arising from policy and implementation variables once interactions are 
included is noticeably higher. This demonstrates that a correct implementation of policies (e.g. namely right 
timing and the allocation of resources to PES) enhances the unemployment reducing effect of the policy cluster.     
Other control variables – such as of union density, the share of the population with tertiary education, the 
strictness of employment protection for temporary workers and the unemployment rate of low-skilled individuals 
– also show significant effects. As explained above in more detail, these variables have been included in the 
analysis to control for the structure of the national labour markets (which may affect the speed of adjustment to 
shocks) and for differences in institutional arrangements (that can affect wage bargaining and macroeconomic 
performance). Their coefficients will not be analysed in this paper since their individual effects are (at least 
partly) already taken up by the other explanatory variables.18   
Effects on the employment rate 
Table 2 presents the results of the employment rate estimations of the two population groups. By and large, these 
findings show the mirror image of the unemployment rate’s results. The policy cluster has a significant positive 
effect on the employment rate of the overall and low-skilled populations. The effect of start-up incentives is also 
positive but this time is only significant for the overall population. Job rotation and job sharing has again a 
negative but non-significant effect on both employment rates. Finally, in line with previous results, ALMPs seem 
to be more effective in boosting the employment rate of the low skilled.  
Likewise, the impact of implementation variables shows the mirror image of unemployment rate estimations. An 
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 The graphic interpretation of the different interaction effects of all estimations is available upon request and in Table 2 of the 
Extended Appendix. 
16
 Given the equation of the interaction effect: unr = a + b1 cluster + b2 (cluster*timing) + b3 timing + e, the effect of the 
interaction term when timing=1 is given by unr = (b1 + b2)*cluster + b3 and the effect of the interaction term when timing=0 is 
given by unr = b1*cluster. 
17
 It is important to note that although the policy cluster*PES allocation and cycle*timing interactions are non-significant for the 
overall unemployment rate, they have been included in the specification given the results of the joint test of interaction coefficients 
in favour of their inclusion (i.e. interaction terms are jointly significant). In this circumstance, a misspecification would occur when 
considering a reduced version of the model without these interactions (Baum, 2006). 
18
 In particular, these control variables show significant results when used as explanatory variables of the two main policy variables 
policy cluster and start-up incentives. These results are available upon request and in Table 3 of the Extended Appendix.  
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increased allocation of resources towards PES, for example, has a positive effect on the employment rate of both 
population groups but this effect is significantly different from zero only in the case of the overall population’s 
employment rate. Moreover, the effect of policy continuity is positive and significant for both population groups 
suggesting that ALMP spending stability would have a boosting effect on the employment rates of the overall 
and low-skilled populations.  
The interaction term between the policy cluster and the allocation of resources to PES is also significant in the 
case of the low-skilled and is positively correlated. The analysis of this interaction illustrates that as more ALMP 
resources are allocated towards PES and administration, the favourable effect of the policy cluster on the low-
skilled employment rate becomes stronger. In addition, whether policies are implemented in a countercyclical or 
procyclical manner also influences the magnitude of the effect of the policy cluster on the employment rate of 
both population groups (i.e. interaction term between policy cluster and timing). This interaction term has a 
negative significant effect on the employment rate of both population groups, implying that when policies are 
implemented in a countercyclical manner (timing=1), the employment enhancing effect of the policy cluster is 
lower. The interpretation of these effects remains the same as in the case of the unemployment rate. This effect is 
again confirmed by the cycle-timing interaction, which is significant only for the overall population. It suggests 
that when policies are implemented countercyclically, the elasticity of the employment rate to the cycle is lower.  
Effects on the labour force participation rate (LFPR) 
Likewise, ALMP intervention has significant effects in the LFPR of the overall and low-skilled populations.                     
Table 3 presents these parameter estimates. The policy cluster variable is positively and significantly correlated 
with the LFPR of both population groups, albeit only at the 10 per cent level for the low-skilled.  
Implementation variables also have some level of significance. Policy continuity has a positive and significant 
effect on both participation rates. Moreover, increasing the allocation of resources towards PES has a positive 
effect on the LFPR of both population groups but this effect is significantly different from zero only in the case 
of the overall population.  
The interaction term between the policy cluster and the allocation of resources to PES is also significant in the 
case of the low-skilled participation rate and is positively correlated. As it was the case with the low-skilled 
employment and unemployment rates, the analysis of this interaction’s parameter illustrates that as more ALMP 
resources are devoted to PES and administration, the favourable effect of the policy cluster on the low-skilled 
participation rate becomes stronger. Similarly, the cluster-timing interaction is significant only for the low 
skilled and has a negative effect, in line with the low-skilled employment rate’s findings. The analysis and 
interpretation of this effect is the same as in the case of the employment and unemployment rates. Finally, the 
effect of ALMPs is enhanced when interactions are included in the analysis.19  
Effect on the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals 
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates for the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals showing that 
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 It is important to note, that in the case of the LFPR of the overall population individual and joint tests for the non-significance of 
interactions terms could not be rejected so all interactions were dropped from the equation. 
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ALMPs have also the potential for reducing the negative “structuralization” of unemployment on weaker groups 
of the labour market, in this case the low-skilled. Yet, unlike the other models, only the policy cluster and the 
timing of the intervention show significant results, negative in both cases.  
A note of caution is in order regarding the robustness of this last model since results did not always hold across 
the different estimations, mainly in the case of estimations that did not include country dummies. This might be 
explained by the fact that the structure of unemployment is particularly heterogeneous across countries. Country 
dummies were thus included in the OLS and FGLS (AR1) estimations to account for the unexplained country-to-
country variation. Adding country dummies, however, has the risk of saturating the model, as it can be seen by 
the size of variance in model (1). 
5.2  Interpretation of results 
To provide an interpretation of the magnitude of the effects discussed above, I use the coefficients on the first 
columns of tables 1 to 4 (which show effects of policy variables before adding the interactions) as basis for some 
calculations. According to the results, increasing an additional standard deviation in the policy cluster (US$4.8 
thousand [PPP] per unemployed) would reduce the overall unemployment rate by around 2 percentage points 
and the low-skilled unemployment rate by close to 3 percentage points. Importantly, the effect would be more 
important for the low-skilled since this increase in spending would be accompanied by a decrease of 1.5 
percentage points in the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals (in total unemployment). In terms of 
employment, raising one standard deviation the expenditure on these policies would boost the overall 
employment rate by around 2.1 percentage points and the employment rate of the low-skilled by 2.7 percentage 
points. Finally, this would be associated with an increase in the LFPR of the two groups by 1.6 and 1.7 
percentage points, respectively. Importantly, in general, ALMPs seem to be more effective in improving labour 
market outcomes of the low skilled. This seems intuitively correct, first, because most policies are targeted 
towards this more disadvantaged group; and second, because higher-skilled individuals are expected to be better 
equipped to find jobs by themselves and so policies targeted to them appear less effective due a potential 
deadweight loss. 
The effect of start-up incentives is also non-negligible, albeit less significant in the case of the low skilled. An 
increase by one standard deviation (US$140 [PPP] per unemployment) in expenditure allocated to start-up 
incentives would be accompanied by a 0.43 and 0.62 percentage points decrease in the unemployment rates of 
the overall and low-skilled populations, respectively. In terms of employment, this increase in spending would 
raise the employment rate of the overall population by 0.29 percentages points. 
Importantly, as shown above, implementation has also significant effects. For example, an increase by one 
percentage point in the share of PES (in total ALMP expenditure) would be associated with a decrease of 3.3 
percentage points in the overall unemployment rate, and an increase by 4.2 and 3.5 percentage points in the 
overall employment and participation rates, respectively. Moreover, a disruption of policy continuity is 
associated with a reduction of 0.17 and 0.14 percentage points in the overall and low-skilled employment rates, 
respectively. It would also affect negatively the overall and low-skilled labour force participation rates by 0.11 
and 0.16 percentage points, respectively. 
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The size of effects arising from policy and implementation variables, once interactions are included, is higher. 
This means that the interaction of the cluster of policies with the right implementation measures (e.g. namely 
right timing of policies and the share of PES spending) enhances their unemployment reducing effect. These 
effects can be attributed to the benefits of individualised service delivery in the case of more generous job search 
conditions (Gaure et al. 2012; Kluve, 2010), while continuity in implementation can generate mutual trust 
between labour market actors and employment service agencies. Moreover, some of the implementation 
variables become significant only once these interactions are in place.  
In more detail, these results suggest that a country with a 10 per cent rate of unemployment (such as France or 
the United States in 2010) would need to spend around US$25,000 (PPP) in policy cluster-type measures for 
every fewer unemployed – i.e. reducing 0.4 for every 10 unemployed would cost US$10,000 (PPP) in a country 
with an unemployment rate of 10 per cent. Following the same logic, this same country would need to spend 
around US$3,300 (PPP) in start-up incentives for every fewer unemployed. According to this, start-up incentives 
would be more effective in reducing unemployment than the policy cluster. This finding is in line with results 
from micro-econometric analyses  showing that start-up incentives are associated with a “double dividend” if 
subsidized firms create more jobs in the future (Caliendo and Künn, 2013; Schmid, 2013). Unfortunately, 
countries usually spend less on start-up incentives, in part because it is commonly believed that these policies 
benefit more the higher skilled who also need less government assistance. This lower expenditure would mean 
that attaining efficient levels of spending per unemployed individual would probably be more challenging. 
France, for example, would need to raise its expenditure per unemployed individual – relative to its 2010 
expenditure – by over 270 and 565 per cent, respectively, in the cluster of policies and start-up incentives if the 
country is to attain the necessary levels for these policies to be the most effective. Importantly, recognition of the 
benefits of supporting new entrepreneurs has increased. France and the United Kingdom, for example, have new 
start-up incentives in place following the 2007 economic crisis (NACRE and Start Up Loans Scheme, 
respectively), which focus on offering longer-term financial, mentoring and follow-up assistance to 
entrepreneurs looking to start or rescue a business.  
To put these numbers in perspective, one could compare the efficient levels of spending in ALMPs presented 
above with costs for alternative options governments would have for supporting unemployed individuals. For 
example, the annual median labour cost per employee in France in 2010 was around US$38,500 (PPP), which 
would suggest that spending in ALMPs would be both economically and socially more efficient than having the 
government employ these people directly. Moreover, keeping these unemployed individuals attached to the 
benefit system has also costs for the government and for society as a whole. Specifically for France, in 2010 the 
cost for society20 of having one unemployed under the out-of-work maintenance and support income was around 
US$12,800 (PPP) per participant. In addition, the government spent over US$7,300 (PPP) per participant in 
2010 in income support measures, principally for the unemployed that had exhausted their entitlement to 
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 This mainly includes the cost of the unemployment insurance system, but also the 50 per cent of the special employment 
assistance programme (AEPE) bared by the unemployment insurance system; and the 40 per cent specific solidarity allowance and 
pension equivalent allowance financed by the solidarity contributions of State employees (Author’s calculations based on Eurostat, 
2013b). 
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unemployment benefits.21 Importantly, the longer individuals are unemployed the less likely it is for them to find 
jobs without assistance. As such, activation measures will be nevertheless needed to facilitate the return to work 
of these long-term unemployed individuals. 
The story is different, however, for a country with a 20 per cent unemployment rate such as Spain. In this 
country, the necessary expenditure in cluster policies to reduce by one the number of unemployed would be over 
US$50,000 (PPP), which is above the annual median labour cost per employee at around US$33,400 (PPP) in 
2010. In this case, start-up incentives would again offer a “bigger bang for the buck” (around US$6,500 [PPP] 
for one fewer unemployed). Yet, this level of expenditure would entail an increase of 1,650 per cent of Spain’s 
2010 expenditure in start-up incentives per unemployed individual, which seems unlikely. 
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 This includes the cost of the partial unemployment scheme (transferred to enterprises), the temporary delay allowance (ATA), the 
50% of the special employment assistance (AEPE) bared by the Central government; and the 60% of specific solidarity and pension 
equivalent allowances financed by the State budget (Ibid). 
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Table 1. Regression results on the unemployment rate adding one interaction at a time 
Notes for all tables: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. All models have been estimated by FGLS with 
AR1 correction (preferred specification). The model relative to the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals also includes country dummies. 
 Unemployment rate Low-skilled unemployment rate 
 
No interaction 
(1) 
Only first 
interact. (2) 
Only second 
interact. (3) 
Only third 
interact. (4) 
Complete 
model (5) 
No interaction 
(1) 
Only first 
interact. (2) 
Only second 
interact. (3) 
Only third 
interact. (4) 
Complete 
model (5) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -0.387*** -0.321*** -2.073*** -0.394*** -2.023*** -0.568*** -0.331** -3.130*** -0.584*** -2.968*** (0.0373) (0.0701) (0.239) (0.0372) (0.245) (0.0825) (0.165) (0.493) (0.0808) (0.515) 
Job rotation and job sharing 
(Policy 2) 
-0.736 -0.834 -0.830 -0.716 -0.905 0.245 -0.0957 0.00750 0.320 -0.231 
(0.576) (0.580) (0.558) (0.589) (0.554) (1.257) (1.225) (1.106) (1.241) (1.164) 
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) -3.065*** -3.137*** -2.158*** -2.998*** -2.320*** -4.423** -4.926*** -2.866* -5.257*** -3.856** (0.768) (0.767) (0.750) (0.782) (0.740) (1.802) (1.771) (1.652) (1.785) (1.725) 
Cluster * PES allocation   -0.323     -0.315   -1.015     -1.089* (0.291)   (0.278) (0.634)   (0.601) 
Cluster * Timing     1.707***   1.722***     2.617***   2.675*** (0.240)  (0.238) (0.494)  (0.494) 
PES allocation -3.298*** -2.897*** -4.564*** -3.451*** -4.096*** -2.005 -0.601 -3.865* -2.200 -2.633 (1.008) (1.063) (0.967) (1.005) (1.018) (2.228) (2.353) (2.096) (2.183) (2.251) 
Continuity in implementation 0.0102 0.0112 0.00602 0.000672 0.000143 0.0104 0.0210 0.0247 -0.192*** -0.155** (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0155) (0.0146) (0.0437) (0.0442) (0.0435) (0.0641) (0.0607) 
Correct timing of policies -1.432* -1.394* -3.110*** -1.166 -2.930*** -2.558* -2.500* -6.097*** 0.0230 -3.625** (0.828) (0.837) (0.770) (0.772) (0.810) (1.335) (1.370) (1.533) (1.428) (1.543) 
Cycle * Timing       -2.73e-06 -3.10e-06       -1.90e-05*** -1.79e-05*** 
 (2.02e-06) (2.01e-06)  (4.54e-06) (4.37e-06) 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0528** -0.0523** -0.0580** -0.0512* -0.0569** -0.0185 -0.0245 -0.0365 -0.0304 -0.0354 (0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0258) (0.0273) (0.0253) (0.0681) (0.0654) (0.0596) (0.0673) (0.0622) 
Population with tertiary education 0.0125 0.0126 0.0211** 0.0155 0.0240** 0.0145 0.0156 0.0338 0.0398* 0.0592*** (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0231) (0.0224) 
Union density 0.0431*** 0.0416*** 0.0245* 0.0345** 0.0212 0.0497* 0.0409 0.0342 0.0338 0.00771 (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0262) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0256) (0.0259) 
EPL for temporary workers -0.117 -0.137 -0.0755 -0.0957 -0.101 -1.277*** -1.242*** -1.095*** -1.186*** -1.079*** (0.171) (0.172) (0.159) (0.167) (0.161) (0.334) (0.334) (0.325) (0.326) (0.313) 
EU 3.404*** 3.433*** 3.821*** 3.319*** 3.620*** 6.293*** 6.339*** 6.716*** 6.124*** 6.752*** (0.755) (0.764) (0.665) (0.704) (0.709) (1.164) (1.200) (1.234) (1.125) (1.117) 
Constant 7.357*** 7.313*** 9.041*** 7.385*** 8.991*** 13.24*** 13.09*** 15.78*** 8.788*** 11.64*** (1.255) (1.262) (1.163) (1.196) (1.189) (2.340) (2.362) (2.385) (2.511) (2.459) 
Observations 452 452 452 452 452 336 336 336 336 336 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
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Table 2. Regression results on the employment rate adding one interaction at a time 
 Employment rate Low-skilled employment rate 
 
No interaction 
(1) 
Only first 
interact. (2) 
Only second 
interact. (3) 
Only third 
interact. (4) 
Complete 
model (5) 
No interaction 
(1) 
Only first 
interact. (2) 
Only second 
interact. (3) 
Only third 
interact. (4) 
Complete 
model (5) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.436*** 0.390*** 1.396*** 0.463*** 1.167*** 0.563*** 0.190 1.701*** 0.685*** 1.850*** (0.0527) (0.100) (0.314) (0.0529) (0.346) (0.110) (0.199) (0.644) (0.118) (0.712) 
Job rotation and job sharing 
(Policy 2) 
-0.883 -0.826 -0.773 -1.056 -0.832 -1.264 -0.696 -0.999 -1.926 -0.908 
(0.711) (0.725) (0.682) (0.745) (0.724) (1.389) (1.392) (1.300) (1.609) (1.497) 
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) 2.085** 2.198** 1.559* 2.282** 1.898** 1.146 1.762 0.558 1.929 1.577 (0.947) (0.963) (0.923) (0.975) (0.967) (1.891) (1.889) (1.800) (2.134) (2.030) 
Cluster * PES allocation   0.220     0.297   1.672**     1.826** (0.381)   (0.378) (0.754)   (0.799) 
Cluster * Timing     -0.979***   -0.791**     -1.189*   -1.638** (0.311)  (0.330) (0.638)  (0.682) 
PES allocation 4.153*** 3.911*** 4.658*** 4.043*** 4.120*** 3.103 0.870 3.745 4.182 2.443 (1.232) (1.328) (1.215) (1.256) (1.351) (2.673) (2.822) (2.591) (2.944) (3.012) 
Continuity in implementation 0.172*** 0.174*** 0.159*** 0.213*** 0.191*** 0.135** 0.125** 0.121* 0.236*** 0.183** (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0377) (0.0392) (0.0385) (0.0629) (0.0626) (0.0627) (0.0874) (0.0828) 
Correct timing of policies -2.901*** -2.989*** -1.448 -5.943*** -4.247*** -4.550** -4.743** -2.591 -6.666*** -4.052* (0.943) (0.942) (1.022) (1.061) (1.240) (2.074) (2.075) (2.328) (2.074) (2.277) 
Cycle * Timing       0.00109*** 0.000891***       7.53e-06 5.26e-06 
 (0.000251) (0.000267)  (6.25e-06) (6.15e-06) 
Cycle 
6.30e-06** 6.52e-06** 5.51e-06** -0.00108*** -0.00088***      
(2.80e-06) (2.81e-06) (2.77e-06) (0.000251) (0.000268) 
    
 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0265 -0.0273 -0.0204 -0.0355 -0.0283 0.0699 0.0684 0.0813 0.0450 0.0587 (0.0377) (0.0380) (0.0361) (0.0397) (0.0380) (0.0747) (0.0737) (0.0697) (0.0873) (0.0796) 
Unemployment rate of the high 
skilled 
-0.773*** -0.771*** -0.712*** -0.832*** -0.768*** -0.585*** -0.563*** -0.523*** -0.540*** -0.433** 
(0.0797) (0.0801) (0.0797) (0.0816) (0.0825) (0.170) (0.169) (0.170) (0.185) (0.182) 
Union density 0.0622*** 0.0647*** 0.0642*** 0.0692*** 0.0730*** 0.0872** 0.100** 0.0907** 0.0945** 0.117*** (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0161) (0.0168) (0.0408) (0.0411) (0.0425) (0.0379) (0.0395) 
EPL for temporary workers -0.655*** -0.655*** -0.677*** -0.453** -0.516** 2.151*** 2.149*** 1.880*** 2.639*** 2.381*** (0.203) (0.203) (0.200) (0.206) (0.206) (0.445) (0.442) (0.438) (0.457) (0.445) 
EU -8.606*** -8.651*** -8.712*** -10.08*** -9.932*** -9.361*** -9.570*** -9.365*** -9.761*** -10.10*** (0.763) (0.760) (0.773) (0.764) (0.783) (1.870) (1.872) (1.995) (1.673) (1.744) 
Constant 76.90*** 76.96*** 75.15*** 80.71*** 78.57*** 51.43*** 51.60*** 49.64*** 52.11*** 49.36*** (1.422) (1.421) (1.495) (1.594) (1.783) (3.163) (3.149) (3.387) (3.216) (3.354) 
Observations 364 364 364 364 364 352 352 352 352 352 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
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                     Table 3. Regression results on the labour force participation rate (LFPR)                    Table 4. Regression results on the share of low-skilled    
                                             adding one interaction at a time                                                   unemployed individuals adding one interaction at a time 
 LFPR Low-skilled LFPR  Share of low skilled unemployed individuals 
  No interaction (1) 
No interaction 
(1) 
Only first 
interact. (2) 
Only second 
interact. (3) 
Complete 
model (4) 
 No interaction 
(1) 
Only first 
interact. (2) 
Only second 
interact. (3) 
Complete 
model (4) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.340*** 0.346*** -0.00243 1.569** 1.360*  -0.315** -0.723** -1.574* -1.995** (0.0535) (0.105) (0.192) (0.666) (0.695)  (0.157) (0.296) (0.924) (0.955) 
Job rotation and job sharing 
(Policy 2) 
-1.481* -0.571 -0.0946 -0.559 -0.0841  1.967 2.486 1.781 2.287 
(0.786) (1.319) (1.360) (1.348) (1.404)  (2.006) (2.026) (1.988) (2.008) 
Start-up incentives (Policy 
3) 
0.587 -0.0873 0.729 -0.576 0.223  -2.711 -1.121 -1.409 0.175 
(1.126) (1.998) (2.050) (2.056) (2.130)  (3.513) (3.656) (3.594) (3.734) 
Cluster * PES allocation   1.681**   1.736**    1.861   1.816 (0.736)  (0.755)   (1.161)  (1.153) 
Cluster * Timing     -1.202* -1.345**      1.261 1.284 (0.657) (0.665)    (0.907) (0.903) 
PES allocation 3.540** 1.171 -0.773 2.321 0.550  2.574 0.190 1.739 -0.586 (1.377) (2.570) (2.757) (2.657) (2.867)  (4.302) (4.574) (4.288) (4.553) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.112*** 0.157*** 0.152** 0.160*** 0.155**  -0.153 -0.140 -0.150 -0.137 
(0.0265) (0.0610) (0.0607) (0.0608) (0.0606)  (0.133) (0.133) (0.131) (0.132) 
Correct timing of policies -3.748*** -4.362** -4.750** -2.979 -3.246  -12.50** -13.69** -14.98** -16.20** (0.794) (2.091) (2.044) (2.219) (2.172)  (6.159) (6.184) (6.367) (6.392) 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0705* 0.0438 0.0380 0.0416 0.0341  0.185 0.186 0.188 0.189 (0.0428) (0.0725) (0.0738) (0.0741) (0.0762)  (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0494*** -0.0472 -0.0475 -0.0554* -0.0572*  -0.00653 -0.0117 0.00846 0.00387 
(0.0139) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0302) (0.0304)  (0.0414) (0.0413) (0.0426) (0.0425) 
Unemployment rate of the 
high skilled 
-0.201** -0.0954 -0.0517 0.0135 0.0714  -0.651*** -0.609*** -0.795*** -0.756*** 
(0.0840) (0.167) (0.169) (0.178) (0.180)  (0.232) (0.233) (0.255) (0.256) 
Union density 0.0999*** 0.127*** 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.148***  0.154 0.169* 0.170* 0.185* (0.0156) (0.0402) (0.0398) (0.0396) (0.0390)  (0.0971) (0.0971) (0.0976) (0.0976) 
EPL for temporary workers -0.873*** 1.383*** 1.465*** 1.417*** 1.525***  1.630** 1.705** 1.581** 1.652** (0.204) (0.435) (0.435) (0.437) (0.437)  (0.785) (0.784) (0.780) (0.779) 
EU -7.094*** -7.905*** -8.230*** -8.390*** -8.806***  -26.76*** -26.91*** -27.90*** -28.07*** (0.691) (1.874) (1.830) (1.840) (1.784)  (5.949) (5.917) (5.991) (5.960) 
Constant 76.04*** 58.87*** 58.91*** 57.23*** 57.05***  58.00*** 59.20*** 59.78*** 60.95*** (1.461) (3.436) (3.397) (3.510) (3.470)  (6.389) (6.417) (6.469) (6.493) 
Observations 336 326 326 326 326  306 306 306 306 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27  27 27 27 27 
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5.3  Sensitivity analysis 
This section discusses the robustness checks that have been carried out to evaluate the sensitivity of the 
parameters presented in tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, based on a number of alternative specifications and tests.  
The use of different samples (i.e. overall and low-skilled populations) in each labour market equation, as 
discussed in the previous section, can be considered as the first robustness check. Results hold and seem to be 
coherent between the two population groups analysed. Moreover, robustness of results was checked by 
excluding key countries (in terms of the relative size of their ALMP expenditure), namely Denmark, Netherlands 
and Sweden, and by running the regressions on EU countries only. With some exceptions, changing the sample 
does not seem to alter the big lines of the estimation results.22 The window of time was also modified to see 
whether results held when studying only the last decade. Overall results seem to hold, with two exceptions: first, 
the policy cluster reveals a loss of significance in affecting the share of low-skilled unemployed. Second, the 
allocation of resources to PES and the timing of policies no longer affect directly the unemployment rate but 
through the interaction with the policy cluster.  
Reduced estimations were also carried out, although results are not provided in this paper. In particular, I 
estimated three reduced models for each dependent variable: the first model estimates only the influence of the 
three policy interventions; the second model tests only implementation variables; and the third model all the 
variables. The description of results was concentrated on the estimations of the full model only. 
Along with these additional specifications carried out, a number of tests were included in the main 
specifications. First, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test was used to control for the non-stationarity of dependent 
variables. In all cases (but one) the tests rejected the null hypotheses of non-stationarity at 1 and 5 per cent 
levels. The exception was the variable share of low-skilled unemployed individuals which seems to be non-
stationary. Moreover, the different models were controlled for heteroskedasticity using the robust option 
available. Robust results did not differ much from non-robust results.  
The problems of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and endogeneity have been taken especially seriously and 
have been dealt with through a number of tests and additional estimation techniques. First of all, the Lagrange-
Multiplier test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) and the abar post-estimation technique (Roodman, 2006) 
were used to test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms. Given that the results of these tests 
confirmed the presence of first order autocorrelation, all specifications were run with a FGLS estimator, which 
allows the assessment in the presence of AR1 autocorrelation within panels, cross-sectional correlation and 
heteroskedasticity across panels.  
Moreover, in an effort to address the reverse causality problem, a final estimation was carried out instrumenting 
(i.e. finding variables correlated with the endogenous variables, but not correlated with error term) two of the 
three policy variables (policy cluster and job rotation and job sharing)23 and the implementation-related 
                                                          
22
 These results are available upon request and in Table 4 of the Extended Appendix. 
23
 The variable start-up incentives was not included among the endogenous variables because the results of the C test of exogeneity 
did not favour its inclusion. Indeed, when the orthogonality conditions of the model including this variable as exogenous were 
tested, the C test indicated robust results. 
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variables continuity and timing through a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. In addition to the other 
exogenous variables of the model, I used two sets of instruments in the analysis. The first one is a set of 
macroeconomic and structural variables including fiscal deficit or public debt (depending on the specification),24 
inflation, the share of the population with tertiary education and total expenditure in passive labour market 
policies. Moreover, the differenced unemployment rate was included in the models explaining the employment 
rate and the two LFPR and the variable terms of trade in the models explaining the unemployment rate, low-
skilled employment rate and LFPR. The second is a set of governability-related indicators. This second set of 
instruments includes two indicators of the colour of the party;25 a dummy variable, reform, taking the value of 1 
if a reform to ALMPs was put in place in that year in the country and 0 otherwise;26 and a continuous variable, 
durable, illustrating the number of years that have passed since a change in governability was implemented in 
the country (Marshall et al., 2013). Reform was excluded from the models explaining the employment rate, and 
the two LFPR because its addition proved to be redundant. Durable was also excluded from the two LFPR 
equations for the same reason. 
Results are presented in Appendix 6 and broadly confirm the findings discussed in previous sections. Accounting 
for the endogeneity of policy and implementation variables leads to the same effect of the policy cluster and 
start-up incentives. In fact, start-up incentives become significant in boosting the low-skilled participation rate 
and in reducing the share of low-skilled unemployment. A difference in the results however, is that job rotation 
and job sharing becomes significant in most of the equations (with the exception of the overall employment rate 
and the low-skilled participation rate) but in an ambivalent manner. An increase in spending in this policy 
appears to be detrimental for the unemployment and employment rates, but positive in boosting overall 
participation and in reducing the share of low-skilled unemployment. This seems intuitive given the aim of these 
policies, i.e. promoting a full or partial replacement of an employee by an individual (unemployed or not) from 
another target group.  
Moreover, the allocation of resources towards PES also gains in significance level in the specifications related to 
the low-skilled when instruments are added. The same occurs with the variable continuity in implementation, 
with exception of the low-skilled employment and the overall LFPR. Finally, the variable timing continues to the 
significant and negatively related with the different employment and participation rates. A change occurs, 
however, in the sign of this variable’s effect on the unemployment rate equations. When instruments are 
included, the coefficient of timing in these two equations becomes positive, implying that when policies are 
implemented in a countercyclical manner they would have an unemployment increasing effect. This represents 
now the mirror image of the employment and participation rates equations. The interpretation of these results 
would be the same explained above. True, policies that are implemented countercyclically may have stronger 
                                                          
24
 To avoid correlation of the instrument with the error term, fiscal deficit was used in the unemployment rate and share of low-
skilled unemployed equations and public debt in the remaining equations. 
25
 Cabinet composition 1, illustrates the percentage of right-wing or left-wing parties (the variable with the lowest correlation with 
the dependant variable was chosen for each model) in total cabinet posts, weighted by days in office (Armingeon et al., 2013a). 
Cabinet composition 2 corresponds to the Schmidt-Index, which takes a value of 1 to 5 depending on whether there is a dominance 
of right-wing or left-wing parties in the composition of cabinets (Armingeon et al., 2013b).  
26
 fRDB-IZA Reforms Database (Anelli et al., year not available). 
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unfavourable effects during booms (when pro-cyclical policies should be implemented) but also stronger 
favourable effects during crises. This confirms the argument in favour of policy continuity. 
All 2SLS models were estimated using the gmm and robust options to compute efficient estimates in presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The exception was the estimation of the share of low-skilled 
unemployed where the robust option was not used. The models showed robust results in the test for the validity 
of instruments in an overidentified context (J-statistic of Hansen to test for overidentifying restrictions) implying 
that the group of instruments used is suitable and that it satisfies the required orthogonality conditions. To test 
whether there are sufficient valid instruments to identify the model (i.e. models are not underindentified) and 
whether models are not relying on weak instruments, the Anderson’s canonical correlations approach was used. 
The null hypothesis was rejected in all models implying that there are enough adequate instruments to estimate 
the equations. This was confirmed as well by Shea’s partial R2 (Baum, 2006). 
Finally, an analysis of the variance was carried out in each of the seven models to assess the percentage of the 
variability of the result that was explained by explanatory variables and how much of that variability was left 
unexplained. In the case of the overall unemployment rate, the R-squared showed that 84.1 per cent of the 
variance was explained by independent variables, while it was 90 per cent in the case of the low-skilled 
unemployment rate. Although high, these are still within the rule of thumb of 90 per cent that is acceptable. The 
variance analysis for the employment and participation rates showed as well shares of the variance within the 
limits acceptable. These figures were 74.6 per cent and 49.9 per cent for the employment rates of the overall and 
low-skilled populations, respectively; and 62.2 per cent and 48 per cent for the LFPR of the overall and low-
skilled populations, respectively. In contrast, the segment of the variance explained by the explanatory variables 
in the estimation of the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals was 92.8 per cent. This shows that the use 
of country dummies to control for country-specific characteristics might be saturating the model in this last case.    
To conclude, the additional analyses carried out broadly confirm the estimation results discussed above. 
Particularly, results remain largely robust across the various specifications, including pooled OLS, OLS models 
with robust standard errors, random-effects and fixed-effects models depending on the results of the Hausman 
test (not reported here), models with country dummies, FGLS estimator to account for serial correlation, as well 
as the instrumental variable estimator 2SLS. Importantly, the results concerning the effect of ALMP in shaping 
the “structuralization” of unemployment on the low-skilled remained more sensitive. Robustness checks show 
that results not always hold across the different estimations, mainly in the case of estimations that did not include 
country dummies, which as explained above may respond to the fact that the structure of unemployment is 
particularly country specific. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effectiveness of ALMPs in improving labour market outcomes, especially for low-
skilled individuals. Much has been written about the effectiveness of activation measures based on evaluations 
carried out using micro data, yet not enough about their effectiveness at the aggregate level. This is particularly 
true with regards to the role of the implementation characteristics of ALMPs in shaping their overall effects. This 
paper aims to contribute to this debate through an aggregate impact approach which is better placed to measure 
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both, the direct and indirect effects of ALMPs. This is done by ways of a pooled cross-country and time-series 
database for 31 advanced countries during the period 1985–2010. Different models were estimated to measure 
the effects of six different ALMPs and three dimensions of their implementation (i.e. allocation of resources to 
public administration, continuity and timing in the implementation of programmes) on the unemployment, 
employment and participation rates of the overall and low-skilled populations and the share of low-skilled 
unemployed individuals. Controls for demand conditions, the structure of the labour market and differences in 
institutional arrangements were included as well. For each specification, different estimators were used to 
control for cross-country heterogeneity, account for serial correlation and address reverse causality.  
In sum, I find that ALMPs matter at the aggregate level. Public expenditure in training, employment incentives, 
supported employment and rehabilitation and direct job creation measures (i.e. the policy cluster) show the most 
favourable results. In particular, the policy cluster appears to have a significant unemployment reducing effect 
and a significant employment and labour force participation expanding effect for the overall and low-skilled 
populations (albeit a low significance level on the LFPR of the low skilled) (Table 5). In addition, results suggest 
that spending in these policies has the potential of reducing the share of low-skilled unemployed. Spending in 
start-up incentives is effective as well but only in reducing the unemployment rate of both population groups and 
in boosting the employment rate of the overall population. Results on the rest of labour market variables studied 
are non-significant.  
In terms of implementation, results show that the most favourable aspect analysed is the allocation of resources 
to programme administration. Indeed, while the share of PES in total ALMP expenditure has a direct and 
favourable impact on labour market variables of the overall population; it affects the low skilled through an 
interaction with the policy cluster. This effect illustrates that as more ALMP resources are devoted to PES, the 
favourable effect of the policy cluster on the low-skilled unemployment, employment and participation rates 
becomes stronger. In addition, a disruption of policy continuity would be associated with negative effects for all 
labour market variables analysed. The effect of policy continuity is significantly negative in the case of the low-
skilled unemployment rate and significantly positive in the case of the employment and LFPR of both population 
groups. It is, however, not significant for the rest of the variables studied. 
Finally, the variable timing, which measures whether policies are implemented in a countercyclical manner 
revealed a significant and negative relationship with all labour market variables analysed but the participation 
rate of the low-skilled. These results show that countercyclical policies (timing=1) have an unemployment 
reducing effect but also an employment and participation reducing effect. Importantly, once estimations are run 
through IV, the effect on the unemployment rate becomes positive showing the mirror image of the employment 
and participation rates. Moreover, the interaction of timing with the policy cluster is also significant for some of 
the variables and has a positive effect on the unemployment rate of both population groups and negative effect 
on the employment rate of both population groups and the participation rate of the low-skilled. This overall 
picture suggests that policies that are implemented pro-cyclically have stronger favourable effects during booms 
but also stronger unfavourable effects during crises, confirming the argument in favour of policy continuity. 
Policy continuity is also supported by the cycle-timing interaction in the two variables where effects were 
significant: the low-skilled unemployment rate and the overall population employment rate. Interestingly, the 
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size of the coefficients arising from policy and implementation variables, once interactions are included is 
noticeably higher. This demonstrates that a correct implementation of policies enhances their beneficial effect. 
Table 5. Synopsis of regression results 
 
UNR  
UNR 
LSK  EMP RATE 
EMP 
RATE 
LSK 
LFPR LFPR LSK 
Share of 
LSK UN 
Policy Cluster  (-)*** (-)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)* (-)** 
Job rotation and job sharing  NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Start-up incentives (-)*** (-)** (+)** NS NS NS NS 
Cluster * PES allocation NS (-)* NS (+)**  (+)** NS 
Cluster * Timing (+)*** (+)*** (-)** (-)**  (-)** NS 
PES allocation (-)*** NS (+)*** NS (+)** NS NS 
Continuity in implementation NS (-)** (+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)** NS 
Correct timing of policies (-)*** (-)** (-)*** (-)* (-)*** NS (-)** 
Cycle * Timing NS (-)*** (+)*** NS    
Cycle    (-)***     
Growth rate of real GDP (-)** NS NS NS (-)* NS NS 
EU (+)*** (+)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Constant (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Observations 452 336 364 352 336 326 306 
Table  1 1 2 2 3 3 4 
Column 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 
Notes: Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
UNR= unemployment rate; LSK= low-skilled; EMP RATE= employment rate; LFPR= labour force participation rate; UN= 
unemployed; and NS means non-significant.  
29 
 
References 
Anelli, M.; Catania, A.; Basso, G.; Colussi, T.; Monti, P.; Zhelyazkova M.; Eichhorst, W. No date. fRDB-IZA 
Reforms Database, Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti. 
Anxo, D.; Carcillo, S.; and Erhel, C. 2001. “Aggregate impact analysis of active labour market policy in France 
and Sweden: a regional approach”, in de Koning, J. and Mosley, H. (eds.): Labour Market Policy and 
Unemployment: impact and process evaluations in selected European countries, Edward Elgar, pp. 49–76.  
Armingeon, K.; Knöpfel, L.; Weisstanner, D.; Engler, S.; Potolidis, P.; and Gerber, M. 2013a. “Comparative 
Political Data Set I 1960-2011”, Institute of Political Science, University of Bern. 
Armingeon, K.; Careja. R.; Knöpfel, L.; Weisstanner, D.; Engler, S.; Potolidis, P.; and Gerber, M. 2013b. 
Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2011, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. 
Bassanini, A. and Duval, R. 2006. “Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role of Policies 
and Institutions”, in OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 35, 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)4. 
Baum, C. 2006. An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata, Stata Press. 
Bellmann, L. and Jackman, R. 1996a. “Aggregate Impact Analysis”, in Schmid, G. O’Reilly, J. and Schömann, 
K. (eds.): International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation, Edward Elgar, pp. 143–162. 
—. 1996b. “The impact of labour market policy on wages, employment and labour market mismatch”, in 
Schmid, G. O’Reilly, J. and Schömann, K. (eds.): International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and 
Evaluation, Edward Elgar, pp. 725–746. 
Blasco, S. and Pertold-Gebicka, B. 2013. “Employment policies, hiring practices and firm performance”, in 
Labour Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 12–24. 
Büttner, T. and Prey, H. 1997. “Does Active Labour Market Policy Affect Structural Unemployment? An 
Empirical Investigation for West German Regions, 1986 to 1993”, in CILE Discussion Papers, No. 42, 
Universität von Konstanz. 
Cahuc, P. and Carcillo, S. 2011. “Is Short-Time Work a Good Method to Keep Unemployment Down?” in IZA 
Discussion Papers, No. 5430.  
Caliendo, M. and Künn, S. 2013. “Regional Effect Heterogeneity of Start-Up Subsidies for the Unemployed”, in 
IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7460. 
Calmfors L. 1994. “Active Labour Market Policy and Unemployment – A Framework for the Analysis of 
Crucial Design Features”, in OECD Economic Studies, No. 22. 
Calmfors, L. and Skedinger, P. 1995. “Does active labour market policy increase employment? – Theoretical 
considerations and some empirical evidence from Sweden”, in Seminar Papers, No. 590, Institute for 
International Economic Studies, Stockholm University. 
Calmfors L. and Lang H. 1995. “Macroeconomic effects of active labour market programmes in a Union Wage-
Setting Model”, in The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 430, pp. 601–619. 
Card, D.; Kluve, J. y Weber A. (2010), “Active labor market policy evaluations: a meta- analysis”, in The 
Economic Journal, Issue 1203 (November), pp. 452–477.  
Cebrián, I.; Moreno, G.; and Toharia, L. 2011. “La Estabilidad Laboral y los Programas de Fomento de la 
Contratación Indefinida”, in Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública, Vol. 198, pp. 103–127.  
30 
 
Clasen, J. and Clegg, D. 2006. “Beyond Activation: Reforming European Unemployment Protection Systems in 
Post‐Industrial Labour Markets”, in European Societies, Vol. 8, Issue 4, pp. 527–553.  
Dauth, W.; Hujer, R. and Wolf, K. 2010. “Macroeconometric Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies in 
Austria”, in IZA Discussion Papers, No. 5217. 
de Koning, J. 2001. “Aggregate impact analysis of active labour market policy: A literature review”, in 
International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 22, Issue 8, pp. 707–735.  
—. 1993. “Measuring the placement effects of two wage-subsidy schemes for the long-term unemployed”, in 
Empirical Economics, Vol. 18, Issue 3, pp. 447–468. 
de Koning, J. and Arents, M. 2001. “The impact of active labour market policy on job hirings and unemployment 
in the Netherlands”, in de Koning, J. and Mosley, H. (eds.): Labour Market Policy and Unemployment: impact 
and process evaluations in selected European countries, Edward Elgar, pp. 78–114.  
de Koning, J. and van Nes, P.J. 1991. “A quantitative approach to process evaluation: the case of the Vermeend-
Moor Act”, in Government and Policy, Vol. 9, pp. 111–118. 
Drukker, D.M. 2003. “Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel-Data Models”, in Stata Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 
168–177. 
Estevão, M. 2003. “Do Active Labor Market Policies Increase Employment”, in IMF Working Papers, 
WP/03/234, December. 
Eurostat. 2013a. Qualitative report: Austria 2011, Labour market policy statistics. 
Eurostat. 2013b. Qualitative report: France 2011, Labour market policy statistics. 
Gaure, S.; Roed, K; and Westlie, L. 2012. “Job search incentives and job match quality”, in Labour Economics, 
Vol. 19, pp. 438–450. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2012.04.001 
Graversen, B.K. and van Ours, J.C. 2008. “How to help unemployed find jobs quickly: Experimental evidence 
from a mandatory activation program”, in Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 92, Issue 10–11, pp. 2020–2035. 
Heylen, F. 1993. “Labour Market Structures, Labour Market Policy and Wage Formation in the OECD”, in 
Labour, Vol. 7, Issue 2, pp. 25–51.  
Hijzen, A. and Martin, S. 2013. “The Role of Short-Time Work Schemes during the Global Financial Crisis and 
Early Recovery: A Cross-Country Analysis”, in IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7291. 
Hotz, V.J., Imbens, G.; and Klerman, J. 2006. “Evaluating the differential effects of alternative welfare-to-work 
training components: a re-analysis of the California GAIN program”, in Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 24, 
pp. 521–566.  
Hujer, R.; Rodrigues, P; and Wolf, K. 2009. “Estimating the macroeconomic effects of active labour market 
policies using spatial econometric methods”, in International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 30, Issue 7, pp. 648–
671. 
Kluve, J. 2010. “The effectiveness of European active labor market programs”, in Labour Economics, Vol. 17, 
pp. 904–918. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2010.02.004. 
Kluve, J.; Lehmann, H.; and Schmidt, C. 2008. “Disentangling Treatment Effects of Active Labor Market 
Policies: The Role of Labor Force Status Sequences”, in Labour Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 1270–1295. 
doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2007.12.002. 
Lalive, R.; van Ours, J.C.; and Zweimüller, J. 2005. “The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of 
31 
 
Unemployment”, in Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 3, Issue 6, pp. 1386–1417. 
Layard R. and Nickell S. 1986. “Unemployment in Britain”, in Economica, New Series, Vol. 53, No. 210, 
Supplement: Unemployment (1986), pp. S121–S169.  
Layard R.; Nickell S. and Jackman R. 2009. Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour 
Market, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
—. 1991. Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Lusinyan, L.; and Bonato, L. 2007. “Work Absence in Europe”, in IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 54, No. 3. 
Marshall, M.G.; Gurr, T.; and Jaggers, K. 2013. Political Regime Characteristics and Transition, 1800-2012 – 
PolityTM IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc. 
Martin, J.P.; and Grubb, D. 2001. “What works and for whom: a review of OECD countries’ experience with 
active labour market policies”, in Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 9–56. 
Neumark, D. 2011. “Policies to Encourage Job Creation: Hiring Credits vs. Worker Subsidies”, in NBER 
Working Papers, No. 16866.  
Nickell, S. and Bell, B. 1997. “Would cutting payroll taxes on the unskilled have a significant impact on 
unemployment?”, in Snower, D. J. and de la Dehesa, G. (eds.): Unemployment Policy: Government Options for 
the Labour Market, CEPR, pp. 296–328. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2004–2012. Education at a Glance 2012: 
OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
—. 1993. “Active labour market policies: Assessing macroeconomic and microeconomic effects”, in 
Employment Outlook, Chapter 2, OECD Publishing, pp. 39–80.  
Ohlsson, H. 1995. “Job Creation Programmes as Stabilisation Policy Measures”, in Johannesson, J. and 
Wadensjö, E. (eds.): Labour Market Policy at the Crossroad, Expert Group for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 
Studies (EFA), Ministry of Labour, Report No. 34, pp. 29–55. 
Pissarides, C. 1990. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Blackwell.  
Román, C.; Congregado, E.; and Millán, J.M. 2013. “Start-up incentives: Entrepreneurship policy or active 
labour market programme?”, in Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 28, Issue 1, pp. 151–175. 
Roodman, D. 2006. “How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to “Difference” and “System” GMM in Stata”, in 
Working Paper 103, Center for Global Development, Washington. 
Scarpetta, S. 1996. “Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Settings on Unemployment: 
A Cross-country Study”, OECD Economic Studies, No. 26, 1996/1, pp. 43–98.  
Schmid, G.; Speckesser, S.; and Hilbert, C. 2001. “Does active labour market policy matter? An aggregate 
impact analysis for Germany”, in de Koning, J. and Mosley, H. (eds.): Labour Market Policy and 
Unemployment: impact and process evaluations in selected European countries, Edward Elgar, pp. 78–114.  
Schmid, G. 2013. Policy Measures to Address Polarisation of the Labour Market: Lessons to Korea from 
Germany and Europe. Paper prepared for the Korean Labour Ministry. 
—. 1996. “New Public Management of Further Training”, in Schmid, G. O’Reilly, J. and Schömann, K. (eds.): 
International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation, Edward Elgar, pp. 725–746. 
32 
 
UNESCO. 1997. International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), November 1997. 
Visser, J. 2011. Data Base Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and 
Social Pacts, 1960–2010 (ICTWSS), version 3.0, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS, 
University of Amsterdam. 
Wooldridge, J.M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
MIT Press. 
 
 
 
33 
 
Appendix 1: Expected effects of specific ALMP on the labour market 
Type of ALMP Expected 
effect: Channel: Actual effect: 
Long- versus 
short-term: Transmission mechanisms: 
Ultimate effect on the 
labour market: 
- Direct job creation Matching process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Participants may reduce their search efforts in the 
knowledge that the employment services will find 
work for them (Bellman and Jackman 1996b). 
Reduced employment 
- Direct job creation Job creation 
Wage-setting 
schedule (workers 
subsidies). Labour 
demand (hiring 
credits). 
Job creation 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
(effects on the 
labour market 
on the 
medium-term)  
Wage subsidies reduce workers’ wage 
expectations increasing labour supply at any given 
market wage and reducing unemployment 
(Ohlsson, 1995). Hiring credits, on the other hand, 
reduce the effective wage paid by employers 
shifting labour demand upwards (Neumark, 2011).   
Increased employment 
and effective wages. 
No inflation of real 
wages in the long 
term. 
- Direct job creation 
- Employment incentives 
and other subsidised 
employment policies. 
Deadweight 
loss Labour demand 
Deadweight loss 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short- to 
medium-term 
Reduced efficiency of programmes since hiring 
from the target group would have occurred even 
in the absence of the programme (Calmfors and 
Skedinger, 1995; Martin and Grubb, 2001; 
Cebrián et al., 2011). 
Deadweight loss 
lowers efficiency of 
programmes if not 
properly targeted 
- Training 
- Supported employment 
and rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
Matching 
process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Improved search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Participants in training courses provide a positive 
signal to potential employers, reducing 
uncertainty about the employability of job 
applicants (Bellman and Jackman 1996b; Layard 
and Nickell, 1986; OECD, 1993). 
Reduced 
unemployment 
- Training Matching process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Participants may reduce their search efforts 
because of a potentially attractive course or in the 
expectation that the course culminates (i.e. lock-in 
effect) (Bellman and Jackman 1996b; Calmfors 
and Skedinger, 1995). 
Reduced employment 
- Training 
- Supported employment 
and rehabilitation (where 
there is provision of 
vocational training) 
Matching 
process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Facilitated 
matching 
(intended effect) 
Long-term 
Training would adjust the qualifications of 
jobseekers to the structure of demand (OECD, 
1993) and reduce “structuralization” (Schmid et 
al. 2001). Specifically for the low-skilled, it would 
increase cross-sector mobility by qualifying them 
for work in sectors where the demand for labour is 
growing (Bellman and Jackman 1996a). 
Lower unemployment 
at least among 
targeted groups. 
- Training 
- To certain degree 
supported employment and 
rehabilitation 
Productivity Labour demand 
Increased 
productivity 
(intended effect) 
Long-term 
Increases in productivity can have externalities 
that contribute to general productivity increases 
(OECD, 1993) and to general technical progress 
of societies (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).  
Reduced 
unemployment 
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(subsidisation) and direct-
job-creation measures with 
on-the-job training 
components. 
- Training 
- To certain degree 
supported employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) and direct 
job creation measures with 
on-the-job training 
components. 
Productivity Labour demand 
Substitution 
effect 
(unintended 
effect) 
Long-term 
Importantly, the labour demand can be reduced if 
this scale effect of labour productivity outweighs 
the substitution effect arising because a given 
output can be produced by fewer, more efficient 
workers (usually when the labour demand is 
elastic) (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). 
Increase in 
employment and 
wages if scale effect 
offsets substitution 
effect. 
- Training 
- To some extent, 
subsidised employment 
policies. 
Labour supply Wage-setting 
schedule 
Increased search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Maintain the unemployed active and available 
during recessions, which would reduce the 
number of vacancies and lower the wage pressure 
(Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; OECD, 1993). 
Positive effect on the 
effective supply of 
labour. 
- PES 
- To some extent, 
employment incentives 
Competition 
for insiders 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Increased 
competition 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Downward pressure on wages due to increased 
competition for vacancies (Bellman and Jackman 
1996b; OECD, 1993; Layard et al. 1991). 
Lower wages and 
lower unemployment. 
- PES 
- Training 
Matching 
process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Improved search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Short- to 
medium-term 
Placement services can improve the effectiveness 
of search (Blasco et al., 2013; Bellman and 
Jackman 1996b). Some believe, however, that this 
positive effect depends on quality of 
implementation (de Koning, 1993). 
Reduced 
unemployment and 
reduced vacancies. 
- PES Matching process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Assistance with job search might raise wage 
pressure by reducing the fear of unemployment 
(Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).  
Reduced employment 
- PES 
- To some extent, direct job 
creation 
Matching 
process Labour demand 
Improved search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Medium- to 
long-term 
Assistance with job search might also increase the 
number of vacancies because opening posts 
becomes less costly for firms (Pissarides, 1990; 
Calmfors and Lang, 1995; OECD, 1993). 
Increased labour 
demand and reduced 
unemployment. 
- Job rotation and job 
sharing 
- Supported employment 
and rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
Competition 
for insiders and 
outsiders 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Increased 
competition 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Programmes targeting specific groups can also 
create more competition for vacancies, creating 
downward pressure on wages (Bellman and 
Jackman 1996b). 
Lower wages and 
lower unemployment. 
But also increased 
welfare for the 
vulnerable groups 
targeted. 
- Job rotation and job 
sharing 
Competition 
for insiders and 
Labour demand Substitution 
effect 
Short-term Substitution effect occurs when jobs created for a 
certain category of workers replace jobs for other 
Reduced labour 
demand for regular 
35 
 
- Supported employment 
and rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
- Direct job creation 
outsiders (unintended or 
intended effect) 
categories (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; de 
Koning and Arents, 2001; Martin and Grubb, 
2001; Dauth et al. 2010). 
employment. Total 
effect on employment 
would depend on the 
scale of the 
substitution effect. 
- Job rotation and job 
sharing 
- Supported employment 
and rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
Labour supply Wage-setting 
schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Targeted policies to specific groups (e.g. youth, 
long-term unemployed, low-skilled) could 
mitigate the fear of unemployment among the 
targeted individuals and thus, reduce the 
incentives to search for jobs (OECD, 1993).27  
Reduced employment 
- Job rotation and job 
sharing 
- Supported employment 
and rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
Matching 
process and 
competition 
effects for 
insiders and 
outsiders 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Increased search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
(effects on the 
labour market 
on the 
medium-term) 
In general, ALMP that target disadvantaged 
groups (especially when used in conjunction with 
benefit conditionality) will put pressure on 
unemployed people to search harder for jobs, 
which will be associated with lower wage pressure 
and more jobs (Bellman and Jackman, 1996a).  
Lower wages and 
lower unemployment. 
- Start-up incentives Job creation Labour demand Job creation Short-term 
Start-up programmes improve employment and 
income prospects, especially for disadvantaged 
groups (Caliendo and Künn, 2013). 
Reduced 
unemployment. But 
also increased 
welfare for the 
vulnerable groups 
targeted. 
- Start-up incentives Competition for insiders Labour demand 
Displacement 
effect 
(unintended 
effect) 
Long-term 
Increased competition could imply that the 
businesses set up by the beneficiaries of start-up 
incentives drive other existing (unsubsidised) 
businesses out of the market (Román et al., 2013). 
Reduced 
unemployment and 
increased 
employment if new 
self-employed do not 
displace unsubsidised 
entrepreneurs. 
 
                                                          
27
 The above, however, would imply that individuals are myopic in terms of the actual risks they face of unemployment. If this were true, myopic individuals would compare themselves with the rest of 
the population rather than with their vulnerable group. This will give them a sense of an increased competition, which will reduce their wage bargain (Bellman and Jackman 1996a). Moreover, many 
authors believe that state dependence underlying reduced search effectiveness is not a sufficient explanation and that the assumption of myopia is overrated (Calmfors and Lang, 1995; Huger et al. 
2009). 
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Appendix 2: Definitions and sources of variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent:   
Unemployment rate Unemployed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the labour force OECD. Stat 
Employment-to-population ratio Employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population 
of the same age (working-age population). OECD. Stat 
Labour force participation rate 
Employed and unemployment persons aged 15-64 as a 
percentage of the population of the same age (working-age 
population). 
OECD. Stat 
Low-skilled unemployment rate  
Low-skilled unemployed individuals as a percentage of the total 
low-skilled in the labour force. 
Low-skilled are individuals with pre-primary, primary and 
lower secondary education (levels 0-2 of ISCED). 
Age definition varies according to different sources: 15-64 in 
the case of Eurostat data; 15+ for ILO data and data gathered 
for Canada, Japan, Korea and New Zealand; and 25-64 in the 
case of OECD data. 
Eurostat, ILO and 
National sources 
Low-skilled employment-to-
population ratio 
Low-skilled employed individuals as a percentage of the total 
low skilled in working-age. 
Low-skilled are individuals with pre-primary, primary and 
lower secondary education (levels 0-2 of ISCED). 
Age definition varies according to different sources: 15-64 in 
the case of Eurostat data; 15+ for ILO data and data gathered 
for Canada, Japan, Korea and New Zealand; 25-64 in the case 
of OECD data; and 25+ for the US data. 
Eurostat, OECD 
and National 
sources 
Low-skilled labour force 
participation rate 
Low-skilled employed and unemployment persons aged 15-64 
as a percentage of the population of the same age (working-age 
population). 
Author’s 
calculations based 
on the low-skilled 
employment and 
unemployment 
rates. 
Share of low-skilled unemployed 
individuals 
Share of unemployed with primary education as a percentage of 
total unemployment. 
World Bank, WDI 
database 
Independent:   
Policy intervention:   
Policy Cluster 
Public expenditure in training, employment incentives, 
supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job 
creation policies. 
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in training 
Public expenditure in institutional, workplace and integrated 
training and special support for apprenticeship.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in job rotation 
and job sharing 
Public expenditure in job rotation and job sharing schemes.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in 
employment incentives 
Public expenditure in recruitment and employment maintenance 
incentives.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
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Public expenditure in supported 
employment and rehabilitation 
Public expenditure in supported employment and rehabilitation 
programmes.   
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in direct job 
creation 
Public expenditure in programmes aimed to create additional 
jobs.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in start-up 
incentives 
Public expenditure in programmes that promote 
entrepreneurship.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Implementation:   
Allocation of resources for the 
implementation of policies 
Public expenditure on programme administration (PES) as a 
percentage of total ALMP expenditure.  
Author’s 
calculations based 
on OECD. Stat 
Continuity of programmes 
implemented 
Difference between the standard deviation of real GDP growth 
and the standard deviation of the growth rate of real expenditure 
in ALMP during the whole period of analysis. 
Author’s 
calculations based 
on Schmid (1996) 
Timing in the implementation of 
programmes  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when policies are 
implemented countercyclically (i.e. regression coefficient 
between ALMP spending and output is negative and that of 
ALMP spending and unemployment is positive); and 0 
otherwise. 
Author’s 
calculations based 
on Schmid (1996) 
Demand Conditions:   
Real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) Annual growth rate of real GDP OECD. Stat 
Structure of the Labour Market:  
Share of the population with 
tertiary education School enrolment, tertiary (% gross). 
World Bank, WDI 
database 
Middle-skilled unemployment 
rate 
Middle-skilled unemployed individuals as a percentage of the 
total middle-skilled in the labour force. 
Middle-skilled individuals are those with upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3-4 of ISCED). 
Eurostat, ILO and 
National sources 
High-skilled unemployment rate 
High-skilled unemployed individuals as a percentage of the 
total high-skilled in the labour force. 
High-skilled individuals are those that have finalized tertiary 
education (levels 5-6 of ISCED). 
Eurostat, ILO and 
National sources 
Institutional arrangements:   
Union density Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners. OECD. Stat 
EPL for temporary workers 
Strictness of regulation on the use of temporary contracts. 
Version 1 (1985-2008) of the employment protection legislation 
indicator.  
OECD. Stat 
Other controls:   
Member of the European Union Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is a 
member of the European Union and 0 if it is not.  
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Appendix 3: Country specific interventions in Austria and how they fit the different ALMP 
categories 
This Box presents a list of all interventions reported by the government of Austria in 2011, grouped by type of 
ALMP according to the OECD categories defined above. 
Notes: *Component of another program 
Source: Eurostat (2013a).
Training: 
Institutional training: Promotion of occupational mobility (course cost and course related cost); Promotion of 
occupational mobility (living allowance); Support for training in institutions; Employment foundations; Further training 
allowance* (Institutional training). 
Workplace training: Support for training in enterprises (encourage persons in enterprises to participate in training 
measures – support for qualification of employees); Vocational training for the disabled. 
Alternate training: None reported 
Special support for apprenticeship: Promotion of apprenticeship training and vocational training; Supra-company 
apprentice training. 
Job rotation and job sharing: 
Job rotation: Further training allowance 
Job sharing: Solidarity premium model (SOL); Promotion of job sharing during part-time parental leave. 
Employment incentives: 
Recruitment incentives: Promotion of regional mobility and entry into employment (travel allowance); Promotion of 
regional mobility and entry into employment (childcare allowance); Integration subsidy (EB); Allowance for enterprises 
without employees. 
Employment maintenance incentives: Promotion of investment and restructuring. 
Supported employment and rehabilitation: 
Supported employment: Support for employment of the disabled through the BSBs; Integration enterprises (BSB). 
Rehabilitation: None reported. 
Direct job creation: 
Socio-economic enterprises (SÖB) and non-profit employment projects (GBP); Childcare institutions. 
Start-up incentives: 
Business start-up programme (UGP+GB). 
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Appendix 4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
No. of 
obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent:      
Unemployment rate 731 7.5 3.9 0.6 23.9 
Employment-to-population ratio 731 66.5 8.0 46.9 84.4 
Labour force participation rate 731 71.5 7.1 56.6 86.0 
Low-skilled unemployment rate 511 12.2 7.7 2.1 53.4 
Low-skilled employment-to-population ratio 498 47.0 12.1 13.3 71.9 
Low-skilled labour force participation rate 490 52.7 11.3 24.5 74.5 
Share of low-skilled unemployed individuals 520 36.6 15.5 0.5 78.4 
Independent:      
Policy Cluster (thousand) 652 4.29 4.83 0.04 27.47 
Public expenditure in training (thousand) 659 1.71 1.95 0.00 10.32 
Public expenditure in job rotation and job sharing 
(thousand) 665 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.39 
Public expenditure in employment incentives (thousand) 662 0.86 1.44 0.00 13.63 
Public expenditure in supported employment and 
rehabilitation (thousand) 660 0.94 1.92 0.00 14.31 
Public expenditure in direct job creation (thousand) 660 0.79 1.19 0.00 6.46 
Public expenditure in start-up incentives (thousand) 664 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.81 
Allocation of resources to the implementation of policies 
(per cent) 623 0.27 0.17 0.02 0.90 
Continuity of programmes implemented 710 -15.0 14.7 -71.0 -1.2 
Right timing in the implementation of programmes 806 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Cycle (billions) 721 40,389 148,061 5.7 10,43,666 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 690 2.8 2.9 -14.1 12.3 
Share of the population with tertiary education 729 48.1 21.0 2.4 103.9 
Middle-skilled unemployment rate 510 7.6 4.3 0.0 26.5 
High-skilled unemployment rate 505 4.5 2.4 1.1 18.3 
Union density 689 34.0 19.5 7.1 83.9 
EPL for temporary workers 613 2.0 1.4 0.3 5.4 
Member of the European Union 806 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
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Appendix 5: Regression results based on three different estimation techniques  
Table A5.1. Regression results on the unemployment rate 
 
Unemployment rate Low-skilled unemployment rate 
 
OLS  
(1) 
GLS  
(2) 
FGLS (AR1) 
(3) 
OLS  
(1) 
GLS  
(2) 
FGLS (AR1) 
(3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -2.469*** -2.435*** -2.023*** -2.843*** -2.797*** -2.968*** (0.230) (0.227) (0.245) (0.483) (0.470) (0.515) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-1.377* -1.386* -0.905 -1.795 -1.841 -0.231 
(0.768) (0.764) (0.554) (1.415) (1.391) (1.164) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
-5.729*** -5.589*** -2.320*** -4.010** -4.268** -3.856** 
(0.934) (0.925) (0.740) (1.877) (1.835) (1.725) 
Cluster * PES allocation -0.694** -0.650** -0.315 0.00688 -0.175 -1.089* (0.294) (0.288) (0.278) (0.679) (0.658) (0.601) 
Cluster * Timing 2.198*** 2.152*** 1.722*** 2.153*** 2.147*** 2.675*** (0.224) (0.222) (0.238) (0.458) (0.446) (0.494) 
PES allocation -6.935*** -6.993*** -4.096*** -3.137 -2.995 -2.633 (1.182) (1.123) (1.018) (3.148) (2.989) (2.251) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.0258* 0.0256* 0.000143 0.257*** 0.138** -0.155** 
(0.0147) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0916) (0.0676) (0.0607) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-4.544*** -2.930*** -6.967** -3.625** 
(1.454) (0.810) (3.331) (1.543) 
Cycle * Timing -7.52e-06 -2.61e-06 -3.10e-06 -3.89e-06 -2.25e-06 -1.79e-05*** (5.87e-06) (3.22e-06) (2.01e-06) (9.94e-06) (6.67e-06) (4.37e-06) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
-0.107** -0.105** -0.0569** 0.0594 0.0727 -0.0354 
(0.0453) (0.0447) (0.0253) (0.0903) (0.0883) (0.0622) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0366*** 0.0315*** 0.0240** 0.0154 0.0123 0.0592*** 
(0.00950) (0.00885) (0.0107) (0.0250) (0.0219) (0.0224) 
Union density 0.0962*** 0.0759*** 0.0212 0.0844 0.0604 0.00771 (0.0211) (0.0180) (0.0145) (0.0588) (0.0449) (0.0259) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.518** -0.487*** -0.101 -1.439*** -1.479*** -1.079*** 
(0.200) (0.185) (0.161) (0.483) (0.436) (0.313) 
EU 3.013** 3.620*** 6.180** 6.752*** (1.372) (0.709) (3.071) (1.117) 
Constant 9.089*** 11.01*** 8.991*** 19.47*** 19.96*** 11.64*** (1.364) (1.906) (1.189) (3.522) (4.398) (2.459) 
Observations 455 455 452 339 339 336 
R-squared 0.841 0.900 
Number of countries28 
  30 27   30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 
per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); and (3) FGLS with AR1 correction. 
OLS estimates include country dummies. 
                                                          
28
 Israel has been dropped from all regressions due to total unavailability of information about union density. Estonia and Luxembourg 
were dropped from GLS (AR1) regressions because not enough information on EPL for temporary workers was available to carry out 
the analysis. The same occurred with Slovenia but with two variables, union density and EPL for temporary workers. This is relevant 
for all equations presented in this appendix.  
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Table A5.2. Regression results on the employment rate 
 
Employment rate Low-skilled employment rate 
 
OLS  
(1) 
GLS  
(2) 
FGLS (AR1) 
(3) 
OLS  
(1) 
GLS  
(2) 
FGLS (AR1) 
(3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 2.919*** 0.917*** 1.167*** 4.208*** 0.941** 1.850*** (0.473) (0.270) (0.346) (0.930) (0.454) (0.712) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-3.201** -0.846 -0.832 -9.899*** 1.214 -0.908 
(1.590) (0.721) (0.724) (3.809) (1.252) (1.497) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
5.918*** 0.914 1.898** 11.07*** -0.777 1.577 
(1.516) (0.848) (0.967) (3.595) (1.481) (2.030) 
Cluster * PES allocation -0.381 -0.116 0.297 2.141* 1.026* 1.826** (0.524) (0.337) (0.378) (1.245) (0.593) (0.799) 
Cluster * Timing -2.154*** -0.711*** -0.791** -3.509*** -0.893** -1.638** (0.442) (0.254) (0.330) (0.883) (0.426) (0.682) 
PES allocation 10.35*** 2.163 4.120*** 15.48*** -3.743 2.443 (1.826) (1.432) (1.351) (4.431) (2.807) (3.012) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.144*** 0.232*** 0.191*** 0.393*** 0.180* 0.183** 
(0.0379) (0.0477) (0.0385) (0.0916) (0.0939) (0.0828) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-2.662** -4.247*** -7.335*** -4.052* 
(1.248) (1.240) (2.159) (2.277) 
Cycle * Timing 0.000595** -0.000422 0.000891*** 2.16e-05*** -2.44e-05** 5.26e-06 (0.000240) (0.000563) (0.000267) (6.05e-06) (1.04e-05) (6.15e-06) 
Cycle -0.000589** 0.000428 -0.000884***    (0.000240) (0.000563) (0.000268)    
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
-0.531*** -0.185*** -0.0283 -0.590** -0.173** 0.0587 
(0.101) (0.0454) (0.0380) (0.247) (0.0799) (0.0796) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.916*** -1.057*** -0.768*** -0.507** -0.809*** -0.433** 
(0.0997) (0.0734) (0.0825) (0.219) (0.131) (0.182) 
Union density 0.0782*** -0.225*** 0.0730*** 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.117*** (0.0154) (0.0242) (0.0168) (0.0370) (0.0432) (0.0395) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.660*** -0.504** -0.516** 4.067*** -0.125 2.381*** 
(0.234) (0.216) (0.206) (0.531) (0.374) (0.445) 
EU -10.12*** -9.932*** -11.59***  -10.10*** (0.575) (0.783) (1.249)  (1.744) 
Constant 75.53*** 82.02*** 78.57*** 46.16*** 49.58*** 49.36*** (1.982) (1.331) (1.783) (3.845) (2.409) (3.354) 
Observations 367 367 364 355 355 352 
R-squared 0.746 0.762 0.499 0.331 
Number of countries 
  30 27   30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 
per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); and (3) FGLS with AR1 correction. 
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Table A5.3. Regression results on the labour force participation rate (LFPR) 
 
LFPR Low-skilled LFPR 
 
OLS  
(1) 
GLS  
(2) 
FGLS (AR1) 
(3) 
OLS  
(1) 
GLS  
(2) 
FGLS (AR1) 
(3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.561*** -0.00223 0.340*** 5.338*** 0.223 1.360* (0.0617) (0.0451) (0.0535) (0.978) (0.479) (0.695) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-3.169* -1.184* -1.481* -4.987 0.568 -0.0841 
(1.716) (0.674) (0.786) (3.917) (1.208) (1.404) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
5.774*** 1.357 0.587 8.335* 0.513 0.223 
(1.752) (0.889) (1.126) (4.272) (1.677) (2.130) 
Cluster * PES allocation 2.730** 1.552*** 1.736** (1.239) (0.580) (0.755) 
Cluster * Timing -4.957*** -0.551 -1.345** (0.940) (0.446) (0.665) 
PES allocation 8.395*** -2.154 3.540** 22.23*** -5.856** 0.550 (1.714) (1.381) (1.377) (4.412) (2.753) (2.867) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.0852*** 0.214*** 0.112*** 0.136** 0.190** 0.155** 
(0.0229) (0.0439) (0.0265) (0.0580) (0.0899) (0.0606) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-4.681*** -3.748*** -1.006 -3.246 
(0.673) (0.794) (2.100) (2.172) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
-0.560*** -0.247*** -0.0705* -0.403 -0.204*** 0.0341 
(0.105) (0.0430) (0.0428) (0.246) (0.0781) (0.0762) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0816*** 0.0369*** 0.0494*** -0.0901** 0.00879 -0.0572* 
(0.0146) (0.0112) (0.0139) (0.0372) (0.0219) (0.0304) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.230** -0.479*** -0.201** 0.291 -0.274** 0.0714 
(0.0963) (0.0616) (0.0840) (0.223) (0.131) (0.180) 
Union density 0.0848*** -0.102*** 0.0999*** 0.200*** 0.176*** 0.148*** (0.0142) (0.0278) (0.0156) (0.0376) (0.0516) (0.0390) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.856*** -0.629*** -0.873*** 3.666*** -0.562 1.525*** 
(0.228) (0.234) (0.204) (0.533) (0.419) (0.437) 
EU -7.047*** -7.094*** -11.71*** -8.806*** (0.559) (0.691) (1.316) (1.784) 
Constant 73.80*** 81.50*** 76.04*** 44.05*** 54.10*** 57.05*** (1.492) (1.724) (1.461) (3.589) (3.175) (3.470) 
Observations 339 339 336 329 329 326 
R-squared 0.622 0.507 
 
0.481 0.141 
 
Number of countries 
 
30 27 
 
30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 
per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); and (3) FGLS with AR1 correction. 
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Table A5.4. Regression results on the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals 
 
Share of low skilled unemployed individuals 
 
OLS  
(1) 
GLS  
(2) 
FGLS (AR1) 
(3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -3.044*** -2.431** -1.995** (1.008) (0.988) (0.955) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
5.036** 4.922** 2.287 
(2.483) (2.474) (2.008) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
-1.131 -1.099 0.175 
(4.222) (4.157) (3.734) 
Cluster * PES allocation 3.258** 3.505*** 1.816 (1.367) (1.335) (1.153) 
Cluster * Timing 1.892** 1.275 1.284 (0.939) (0.920) (0.903) 
PES allocation 2.203 1.831 -0.586 (5.921) (5.734) (4.553) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
-0.140 0.0215 -0.137 
(0.196) (0.137) (0.132) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-6.246 -16.20** 
(7.092) (6.392) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
0.388** 0.318* 0.189 
(0.169) (0.167) (0.118) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
-0.00589 -0.0475 0.00387 
(0.0450) (0.0411) (0.0425) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.977*** -0.831*** -0.756*** 
(0.273) (0.264) (0.256) 
Union density 0.252** 0.186** 0.185* (0.106) (0.0865) (0.0976) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
3.059*** 3.342*** 1.652** 
(0.927) (0.858) (0.779) 
EU 0.235 -28.07*** (6.358) (5.960) 
Constant 27.66*** 37.26*** 60.95*** (6.714) (9.422) (6.493) 
Observations 309 309 306 
R-squared 0.928 
  Number of countries 
 
30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 
1 per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); and (3) FGLS with AR1 
correction. Model (3) includes country dummies. 
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Appendix 6: Results of IV estimations (2SLS) 
 
 
Unemployment 
rate 
Low-skilled 
unemployment 
rate 
Employment 
rate 
Low-skilled 
employment 
rate 
Labour force 
participation 
rate 
Low-skilled  
participation 
rate 
Share of low 
skilled 
unemployed 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -0.594*** -0.776*** 0.725* 1.117*** 0.809** 1.734*** -1.636*** (0.0872) (0.183) (0.423) (0.223) (0.325) (0.469) (0.617) 
Job rotation and job sharing (Policy 2) 7.559*** 7.996** 27.01 -9.628** 30.30** 0.688 -27.95** (2.812) (3.989) (16.59) (4.657) (13.16) (22.61) (14.05) 
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) -4.099*** -11.54*** 7.809*** 4.389 2.600 19.33*** -46.79*** (1.563) (2.227) (3.015) (2.939) (2.748) (3.983) (11.54) 
PES allocation -12.17*** -21.83*** 6.399 10.13** 1.174 30.88*** -103.9*** (2.025) (4.328) (4.006) (4.394) (2.583) (5.527) (18.24) 
Continuity in implementation -0.487*** -0.683*** 0.568*** 0.281 0.0134 0.810** -1.956** (0.0787) (0.182) (0.191) (0.235) (0.125) (0.354) (0.840) 
Correct timing of policies 6.647*** 5.558** -13.75*** -20.10*** -12.63*** -15.67*** -11.41 (0.986) (2.205) (3.807) (3.039) (2.831) (5.078) (9.284) 
Constant 7.932*** 15.20*** 95.74*** 56.76*** 91.01*** 56.46*** 103.6*** (1.573) (3.482) (6.976) (4.055) (3.040) (6.754) (12.32) 
Observations 226 175 314 175 314 305 156 
R-squared 0.422 0.478 0.320 0.690 0.068 0.359 0.134 
Underidentification test          
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic) 61.5*** 30.49*** 22.39*** 40.94*** 21.25*** 21.29*** 16.37*** 
Weak-instrument-robust inference 
(Anderson-Rubin Wald test) 79.82*** 58.94*** 73.12*** 152.8*** 39.32*** 37.73*** 105.66*** 
Overidentification test of all instruments 
(Hansen J statistic) 5.832 5.675 6.19 7.65 4.599 2.671 1.933 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
All models have been estimated by 2SLS, using gmm and robust options to compute efficient estimates in presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The exception is (7) where the 
robust option was not used. 
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